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I. INTRODUCTION
TfHE epidemic of HIV disease has brought about a revival of
what may loosely be denominated "public health law," cases
concerning state action taken in the name of preventing ill health
or promoting good health. Sixty years of gradually diminishing
interest in the subject rather abruptly came to an end, and for the
past several years commentators and courts have been working
out the working out of public health issues in the world of mod-
ern law and medicine.
Public health cases take a variety of legal forms.' In the age
t Staff Attorney, AIDS & Civil Liberties Project, American Civil Liberties
Union of Pennsylvania; Lecturer in Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School;
J.D. Yale Law School (1987); B.A. Washington University in St. Louis (1980).
The author wishes to thank Susan Carle, Harlon Dalton, Sarah Barringer
Gordon, Sung-Hey Lee, A. Brigid A. Rentoul, William Rubinstein and Doreena
Wong for their assistance in the preparation of this essay.
1. "Public health cases" have never fallen into a neat doctrinal package.
Challenges to such preventative measures as compulsory vaccination, water fluo-
ridation and diagnostic testing, for example, have been grounded in the substan-
tive due process clause, see, e.g., Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. I I (1905),
the free exercise clause, see, e.g., State ex rel. Dunham v. Board of Educ., 154 Ohio
(933)
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of AIDS, developments in both constitutional and statutory law
have contributed to an abundance of doctrinal riches. The Con-
stitution protects a broader spectrum of rights than it did when
the leading health cases were decided at the turn of the century.2
Moreover, it is no longer the only source of limitations on the
states' police power to protect public health. With the passage of
federal statutes dedicated to eliminating discrimination on the ba-
sis of handicap, notably section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973, a whole new set of limitations was placed on those acting in
the name of public health, including state and local govern-
ments." Cases that once would have been understood as involv-
St. 469, 96 N.E.2d 413, cert. denied, 341 U.S. 915 (1951), the fourth amendment,
see, e.g., Glover v. Eastern Neb. Community Office of Retardation, 686 F. Supp.
243 (D. Neb. 1988), aff'd, 867 F.2d 461 (8th Cir. 1989), and the equal protection
clause, see, e.g., Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174 (1922), not to mention more prosaic
claims of improper delegation or ultra vires action, see, e.g-., Shuringa v. City of
Chicago, 30 I11. 2d 504, 198 N.E.2d 326 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 964 (1965).
Recent decisions relating to the admission to school of children with HIV
have turned on the Rehabilitation Act, see, e.g., Doe v. Belleville Pub. School Dist.
No. 118, 672 F. Supp. 342 (S.D. Il1. 1987), the Education for All Handicapped
Children Act, see, e.g., Martinez v. School Bd., 861 F.2d 1502 (11 th Cir. 1988);
White v. Western School Corp., No. IP 85-1192-C (S.D. Ind. Aug. 23, 1985),
and state administrative law, see, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Cooperman, 209 NJ.
Super. 174, 507 A.2d 253 (1986), modified, 105 N.J. 587, 523 A.2d 655 (1987).
Procedurally, public health cases have arisen as counterclaims in state-initiated
proceedings, see, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Maas, 56 N.J. Super. 245, 152 A.2d 394
(1959), aft'd, 31 N.J. 537, 158 A.2d 330, cert. denied, 363 U.S. 843 (1960), as
requests for an injunction against state action, see, e.g., Paduano v. City of New
York, 45 Misc. 2d 718, 257 N.Y.S.2d 531 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 24 A.D.2d 437, 260
N.Y.S.2d 831 (1965), aff 'd, 17 N.Y.2d 875, 218 N.E.2d 339, 271 N.Y.S.2d 305
(1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1026 (1967), as suits for the writ of habeas corpus,
see, e.g., Varholy v. Sweat, 153 Fla. 571, 15 So. 2d 267 (1943), as employment
discrimination suits, see, e.g-., Chalk v. United States Dist. Court, 840 F.2d 701
(9th Cir. 1988), as tax-payer actions, see, e.g., Kraus v. City of Cleveland, 55 Ohio
Op. 6, 116 N.E.2d 779 (C.P. 1953), afftd, 55 Ohio Op. 36, 121 N.E.2d 311 (Ct.
App. 1954), afftd, 163 Ohio St. 559, 127 N.E.2d 609 (1955), appeal dismissed, 351
U.S. 935 (1956), and as defenses in criminal proceedings, see, e.g.,Jacobsoll, 197
U.S. il.
In all these cases, certain obvious definitional criteria are met: the state, in
the name of improving public health, has taken action that has aggrieved some-
one sufficiently to confer standing to oppose the action in court. This "defini-
tion" is intentionally tautological. These cases are about public health not
because they meet an external standard, or because they are carried out by
health officials, but because they are justified with reference to, and actually de-
fine, the public health.
2. For example, the right of medical privacy, see Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S.
589 (1977), has been raised in challenges to a variety of health actions. See, e.g.,
Doe v. Coughlin, 697 F. Supp. 1234 (N.D.N.Y. 1988) (granting preliminary in-
junction, on privacy grounds, against involmntary transfer of HIV-positive in-
mates into separate prison dormitory).
3. See Rehabilation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C.A. § 794 (West 1985 & Supp.
1989). The Supreme Court resisted application of the Rehabilitation Act to
state governments in Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985)
934 [Vol. 34: p. 933
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ing state action to protect the public health are now viewed,
under the Rehabilitation Act, as cases about the rights of the
handicapped. 4 And not just that: they became cases in which
state health actions are unabashedly evaluated by objective medi-
cal criteria, and in which key policy questions, such as the level of
acceptable risk, are taken out of state hands. Similarly, the 1966
holding that blood tests ordered by the government were subject
to the fourth amendment 5 created the possibility that case identi-
fication through diagnostic testing, an increasingly common pub-
lic health practice, would fall under yet another legal standard
entailing close scrutiny of the medical bases of the state's
decision."
There appears to be little doubt that judicial review of health
actions under the "new" public health law of the Rehabilitation
Act and the fourth amendment, as well as the fourteenth amend-
ment cases in which heightened scrutiny will apply, 7 will entail a
specific examination of the medical benefits and social costs of
public health actions. But in the confusion of the developing
public health law, there remains the important question of the ap-
propriate standard of review of constitutional challenges to public
health actions which do not trigger heightened scrutiny.
Two distinct points of view have developed. Following one
view, which is derived from careful reading of past public health
decisions relating to communicable disease control, courts re-
quire health actions to have reasonable medical support and a
(eleventh amendment bars application of Rehabilitation Act to states), but Con-
gress subsequently overruled Atascadero with the enactment of 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000d-7 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
4. This development was quietly announced in 1979 in Judge Newman's
fine opinion in New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Carey, 612 F.2d
644 (2d Cir. 1979).
5. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
6. For an introductory description of common public health actions, see
Gostin, Traditional Public lealth Strategies, in AIDS AND THE LAW: A GUIDE FOR
THE PUBLIC 47 (H. Dalton, S. Burris & the Yale AIDS Law Project eds. 1987).
7. The application of heightened scrutiny in public health cases has been
well-covered in the literature. See, e.g., Gray, 7he Parameters of .1ladatory Public
Health Heasures and the AIDS Epidemic, 20 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 505 (1986); Parmet,
AIDS and Quarantine: The Revival of an Archaic Doctrine 14 HOFSTRA L. REV. 53
(1985); Note, Reportabilitv of Exposure to the AIDS irus: An Equal Protection Analysis,
7 CARDOZO L. REV. 1103 (1986); Note, Preventitig the Spread of AIDS by Restlicting
Sexual Conduct in Gay Bathhouses: A Constitutional .-Inalysis, 15 GOLDEN GATE U.L.
REV. 301 (1985) [hereinafter Note, Preventing the Spread]; Note, The Constitutional
Rights of AIDS Carries, 99 HARV. L. REv. 1274 (1986) 1hereinafter Note, Coustitu-
tional Rights]; Comment, AIDS-A New Reason to Regu/ate Ilomosexuality?, II J.
CONTEMP. L. 315, 333-38 (1985); see also Sullivan & Field, AIIDS and the Coercive
Power of the State, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 139 (1988).
1989] 935
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public health value that outweighs their cost to individuals.
These substantive limitations will be applied openly or covertly by
courts without regard to the standard of review normally deemed
appropriate to the specific legal claim.
A second view begins in general constitutional law, applying
the rational basis test and principles of deference to state political
decisions regarding the exercise of the police power. Following
this view, courts reviewing constitutional challenges to health ac-
tions will, in the absence of any factor triggering a heightened
standard of review, use the same test in health cases as in any
other challenge under the equal protection or substantive due
process clauses.
Each of these views has virtue, but neither provides a suffi-
cient account of both practice and doctrine. There is undoubt-
edly a tendency in public health cases to look more closely at the
actual utility of state actions than is the practice with other kinds
of legislative decisions. But whether this is a product of cultural
factors (e.g., the attitudes ofjudges towards health matters), or of
superannuated legal doctrines, the fact remains that such an ap-
proach lacks a clearly stated doctrinal justification. The Supreme
Court, in an important footnote in School Board v. Arline,8 has indi-
cated a preference for the first view, and has perhaps hinted at a
proper test, but has not provided a clear explanation of the legal
basis for that view.
Each of these views of judicial review treats medical science
in general and public health practice in particular as objective
sources of neutral standards. Before examining judicial review in
action, this essay therefore criticizes the idea of public health as
an apolitical science. Indeed, the construction of a vision of pub-
lic health-as scientific, political, or some hybrid-is a threshold
act of enormous importance to any judicial review.
An examination of several prominent public health cases-
under the fourth amendment and the Rehabilitation Act as well as
the fourteenth amendment-illustrates the apparent impossibility
of holding to a purely political vision of public health decisions.
Almost invariably there is an appeal to the authority and neutral-
ity of medicine. This, in turn, raises two basic questions about
rationality review in public health. The first, which is answered
here, is what test is to be applied: a health measure cannot be
rationally related to a legitimate state interest unless it has a ra-
8. 480 U.S. 273, 286 n.15 (1987).
936 [Vol. 34: p. 933
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tional medical basis. This is a sensible test that does not impair
the ability of states to protect public health, but a second question
remains: how does this test fit into the framework of general con-
stitutional law? The Court constructed the house of equal protec-
tion scrutiny, and it can alter it. A rational medical basis test may
be accommodated as heightened scrutiny, or, as this essay sug-
gests, focused scrutiny, or it may be applied without justification
at all, but that is simply a matter of the Court's power. The ques-
tion this essay restates is: why medicine and not, for example,
Judge Posner's economic interpretation of law? We are left with a
better sense of what courts are to do, and, one hopes, a greater
understanding of the judicial reliance on medicine, but the old
hard questions about rationality review remain.
II. Two VIEWS AND FOOTNOTE FIFTEEN
Initial attempts to derive from past public health cases rules
for the disposition of modern cases about AIDS focused more on
practice than doctrine,!' leading to the development of what I
shall label the "behavioral" view of rationality review."' From the
obvious fact that the actual value of a public health action did not
vary according to the legal theory under which it was attacked,
flowed the not unreasonable (though not necessarily acknowl-
edged) assumption that certain basic criteria would and should be
applied by courts in review. A substantive, medically-based test
was obviously being applied in modern cases under the Rehabili-
tation Act, but commentators found similar values in past consti-
tutional public health cases. The ad hoc committee on AIDS of
the American Bar Association, for example, has summarized
these limitations as follows:
Despite . . . deference to public health decisions, the
early public health cases laid down certain substantive
limitations on public health powers: (1) the true pur-
pose of the legislation must be public health, not a dis-
guised form of prejudice; (2) there must be some
discernable public health necessity supported by scien-
tific evidence or expertise; (3) the control measure itself
9. See Current Topics in Law and Policy, Fear Itself" AIDS, Heipes and Public
Health Decisions, 3 YALE L. & POL'' REV. 479 (1985) (authored by Scott Burris)
[hereinafter Burris, Fear Itselfl.
10. The label is used only because proponents of this view have concen-
trated on what courts do, rather than upon their legal explanations for their
conduct. No reference to behavioralism is intended.
1989]
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must not pose a significant health risk; and (4) there
must be a reasonable relationship between the measure
adopted and the objective of reducing the spread of in-
fectious disease. I'
Few would dispute that these are minimal requirements any
court ought to demand of a public health action. Fewer still
would argue that they were not, at one time, requirements that
had a basis in law. What remains unexplained is the assertion that
these kind of limitations "still survive, and should apply in a con-
temporary judicial analysis."' l The behavioral view provides a
good account of what courts tend to do in health cases, without
explaining why that conduct is doctrinally appropriate today.
The alternative view, which I shall label the "doctrinal" one,
is considerably more hard-headed about post-Lochner rationality
review. It suggests that courts will not distinguish between chal-
lenges to health measures and attacks on other state political de-
cisions.' I Assuming no aspect of a health action triggered a
higher level of review, and that a court would find reducing the
spread of HIV a proper purpose,' 4 we may expect courts to apply
a test that asks only whether there exists some conceivable expla-
nation of the state's conduct that can be coherently stated with
reference to some state of the world. 15 This is not to say that
11. ABA AIDS COORDINATING COMM., AIDS: THE LEGAL ISSUES 52-53
(Aug. 1988) (discussion draft) (citing Gostin & Curran, Legal Control Measures for
AIDS: Reporting Requirements, Surveillance, Quarantine, and Regulation of Public Meet-
ing Places, 77 AM.J. PUB. HEALTH 214 (1987)); accord Burris, Fear Itself, supra note
9, at 496. A leading proponent of this view has been Lawrence Gostin. See, e.g.,
Gostin, supra note 6, at 52-53; see also Gostin, The Future of Public Health Law, 12
AM.J. L. & MED. 461, 465-68 (1987).
12. Gostin, supra note 11, at 468.
13. Professor Merritt's article is the definitive expression of this account.
Merritt, Coninunicable Disease and Constitutional Law: Controlling AIDS, 61 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 739 (1986); see Note, Constitutional Rights, supra note 7; see also Kushnar, Sub-
stanfive Equal Protection: The Rehluquist Court and the Fourth Tier off udicial Review, 53
Mo. L. REV. 423, 449-50 (1988) ("Government classifications established . . .
seeking to protect the public health, such as in the case of quarantine ... laws,
... are accorded maximum deference under the rational basis test.").
14. See Note, Constitutional Rights, supra note 7, at 1280.
15. Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Schools, 108 S. Ct. 2481, 2489-90 (1988)
(Anyone "challenging the legislative judgment must convince us 'that the legis-
lative facts on which the classification is apparently based could not reasonably
be conceived to be true by the governmental decisionmaker.' ") (quoting Vance
v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 111 (1979)). See also Bowen v. Owens, 476 U.S. 340, 348
(1986); Spece, AIDS: Due Process, Equal Proection, and the Right to Treatoent, 4 Is-
SUES L. MED. 283, 286-88 (1988) (summarizing due process and equal protec-
tion analysis in health law context). See generallv 2 L. ROTUNDA, J. NOWAK & J.
YOUNG, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 18.3,
938 [Vol. 34: p. 933
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courts in health cases will not go about defining rationality in pre-
cisely the manner described by the behavioralists. Arguably,
something like that happened in the case of City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Center.Il But the problem ofjustifying dentures for
a standard designed to be toothless is not for the doctrinalist to
solve. The doctrinal view simply suggests that the barriers to sub-
stantive review built into the rational basis test will not deliber-
ately be lifted in health cases.
Neither the behavioral nor the doctrinal view provides a sat-
isfactory account of both law and practice. Under the behavioral
view, we would expect a court applying the rational basis test to
engage in substantive, context-specific scrutiny of a challenged
health measure, a serious departure from doctrinal propriety. Yet
the doctrinal view, which would treat communicable disease con-
trol in the same manner as, say, the regulation of street vendors,' 7
does not address the gravitational force of the new public health
law, and does not recognize the degree to which courts in tradi-
tional public health cases have in fact tested the specific rational-
ity of challenged health measures.' 8 The behavioral view thus
provides the best account of what actually happens in health
cases, while the doctrinal view jibes with the legal rules that, with-
out more, one would expect to apply. '
The Supreme Court appears now to have indicated a prefer-
at 330 (1986) (discussing rationality review); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITU-
riONAL LAW §§ 16-2 to -3 (2d ed. 1988) (same).
16. 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (invalidating, as applied under minimal scrutiny,
zoning ordinance requiring special use permit for group home for mentally re-
tarded); see Merritt, supra note 13, at 783; see also Gostin, supra note I1, at 471
(discussing Cleburne-style rational basis testing in health cases). Cleburne stands
as the prime example of what Professor Tribe calls "covertly heightened scru-
tiny"-penetrating judicial examination cloaked in the rhetoric of extreme def-
erence. See L. TRIBE, supra note 15, § 16-3, at 1443-44.
An alternative view to Professor Tribe's is that Cleburne openly requires
some enhancement (or, as I shall characterize it, focusing) of scrutiny. And, in-
deed, one court of appeals has read Cleburne as specific justification for "a more
searching inquiry" in cases involving physical or mental handicaps. Brennan v.
Stewart, 834 F.2d 1248, 1259 (5th Cir. 1988).
17. See City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976).
18. This is not to say that courts never apply a standard rational basis test in
health cases, but only that it is rare. For a particularly troubling example of
rationality review, see Doe v. Coughlin, 71 N.Y.2d 48, 518 N.E.2d 536, 523
N.Y.S.2d 782 (1987) (denial of conjugal visits to innate with AIDS), cerl. denied,
109 S. Ct. 196 (1988). See also New York Soc'y of Surgeons v. Axelrod, 200
N.Y.L.J. No. 96, at 29 (Sup. Ct. 1988) (rejecting plaintiff's attempt to force state
health official to declare HIV a transmissible disease).
19. One need not believe that legal rules are determinate in order to take
the equal protection doctrine seriously. A judge's desire to follow the rules, or
her belief that she is doing so, invests the rules with enough determinacy to
1989] 939
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ence for the behavioral view, without addressing the questions
raised by the doctrinal account. In School Board v. Arline,2- 1 the
Court held that contagious diseases could be handicaps under
section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, which prohibits discrimina-
tion against the handicapped in programs or activities receiving
federal funds. As I will discuss in more detail, 2 1 scrutiny under
the Act is close, based on the congressional mandate that deci-
sions limiting the access of the handicapped to the amenities of
modern life rest on valid medical considerations, rather than ab-
stract fears or prejudice.
Because the Act applies to state health decisions that once
were subject only to constitutional challenges, some argued that
extending the Act to cover communicable diseases would conflict
with traditional state prerogatives to address health threats under
the police power. 2 Several states, joining California's amicus
brief, disagreed, contending among other things that most health
actions do not involve discrimination (e.g., uniform school vacci-
nation requirements), or were already substantially limited by the
Constitution (e.g., quarantine). 23 The brief, which had adopted
the behavioral account, 24 concluded that little, if any, conflict
would arise between review under the statute and under the
Constitution:
[A]llowing a cause of action to be maintained does not
mean that exclusions based on demonstrable and sup-
portable medical concerns will not ultimately be upheld.
It simply subjects such decision [sic] to scrutiny and al-
lows those which are not or cannot be supported to be
set aside. If Section 504 were invoked to preclude ac-
attract the attention of an attorney whose success in a constitutional health case
is contingent upon a judge's willingness to examine the medical facts.
20. 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
21. See infra notes 47-65 and accompanying text.
22. See, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 16-17, School
Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987) (No. 85-1277).
23. Brief of the State of California joined by Maryland, Michigan, Minne-
sota, New Jersey, New York and Wisconsin as Amici Curiae at 25-28, School Bd.
v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987) (No. 85-1277).
24. The amici wrote:
Generally speaking, [public health actionsi have been upheld where
public health officials can demonstrate a public health necessity, that is,
the existence of a public health problem and at least a rational and de-
monsirable relationship, based on medical evidence, between the
means chosen and the problem. Where individual liberty is restrained,
the least restrictive alternative must also be chosen.
Id. at 28 (citing Burris, Fear Itself, supra note 9, at 488-95).
940 [Vol. 34: p. 933
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tions by health officials which were based on irrational,
uninformed or medically unsupportable distinctions, the
public interest would be furthered not hindered.25
The Court agreed with California:
Construing section 504 not to exclude those with conta-
gious diseases [from its protection] will complement
rather than complicate state efforts to enforce public
health laws. . . . [C]ourts may reasonably be expected
normally to defer to the judgments of public health offi-
cials in determining whether an individual is otherwise
qualified unless those judgments are medically unsup-
portable. Conforming employment decisions with medi-
cally reasonable judgments can hardly be thought to
threaten the States' regulation of communicable
diseases. 2 6
That sounds right, which is one of the chief virtues of the
behavioral account. Public health decisions are substantially
medical in character and ought to be made on a medically rational
basis. Certainly, too, there would be little to be said for an ap-
proach that found a health action to be based on irrational preju-
dice under the Rehabilitation Act but rationally related to a
legitimate state interest for constitutional purposes. But, as the
doctrinal view makes clear, decisions being reviewed under the
rational basis test have been required only to be constitutionally ra-
tional, a species of rationality having more to do with logic than
experience. This theory of review, designed to respect the pre-
rogatives of state decisionmakers to take action on any not pa-
tently illegitimate basis, theoretically does not require any
consideration of medical facts at all.
In previous opinions under the Act, at least two courts of ap-
peals had perceived a conflict between the kind of review appro-
priate under the Act and the rational basis test.2 7 In a 1983 case,
the Third Circuit allowed that officials
25. Id. at 29.
26. Arline, 480 U.S. at 286 n.15. The Court went on: "Indeed, because the
Act requires employers to respond rationally to those handicapped by a conta-
gious disease, the Act will assist local health officials by helping remove an im-
portant obstacle to preventing the spread of infectious disease: the individual's
reluctance to report his or her condition." Id.
27. See Strathie v. Department of Transp., 716 F.2d 227, 231 (3d Cir. 1983);
New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Carey, 612 F.2d 644, 648-49 (2d
Cir. 1979).
1989]
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surely are entitled to some measure ofjudicial deference
... by reason of their experience with and knowledge of
the program in question. On the other hand, broad judi-
cial deference resembling that associated with the 'ra-
tional basis' test would substantially undermine
Congress' intent in enacting section 504 that stereotypes
or generalizations not deny access to federally-funded
programs.28
In suggesting that there not only is no serious conflict be-
tween the standards applicable under the Act and the Constitu-
tion, but also that constitutional scrutiny is coextensive with the
close analysis of the Act, Justice Brennan at a stroke adopted the
behavioral position in toto, and, in the process, identified a sub-
stantive requirement of medical reasonableness in a class of deci-
sions which, at least in theory, were previously subject only to a
general test of hypothetical rationality.
III. THE HEALTH DECISION: As Is, AND As SEEN
Underlying the behavioral and doctrinal accounts are funda-
mentally different constructions of what the public health case
concerns. At the core of the behavioral account of public health
review is the recognition that these cases, whether under the four-
teenth amendment, the fourth amendment, or the Rehabilitation
Act, are all about the same sort of thing-the adoption of a mea-
sure to protect public health. Implicit are the notions that it mat-
ters how well the particular measure will serve the goal of
protecting public health; that its adequacy will be the chief issue
in a legal challenge; and that this issue will be decided principally
as a matter of medical judgment. A doctrinalist, however, is
bound to the view that any serious consideration of the actual
value of a health measure is inappropriate in modern rational ba-
sis review. A decision to exercise the police power to protect the
public health is an essential act of state sovereignty, involving im-
portant political choices. Unless it is utterly arbitrary and irra-
tional, the court has no role to play. The deferential standard of
review keeps the federal courts out of the business of second-
guessing these legislative determinations by presuming their cor-
rectness and accepting virtually any logical justification in their
support. The health case is not about the value of a health mea-
sure, but the state's unhindered political freedom.
28. Strathie, 716 F.2d at 231 (footnotes and citations omitted).
[Vol. 34: p. 933
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The behavioral account is baldly anti-majoritarian. The doc-
trinal view partakes of the tautology inherent in modern rational-
ity review. Both avoid their theoretical extremes by appealing to
science as an objective measure. The behavioralists treat
medicine as apolitical. The doctrinalists will use medical science
as the neutral tool for justifying a decision that an action is arbi-
trary and irrational. While I confess that I can come up with no
better standard, the heavy burden science bears in both accounts
ofjudicial review makes it worth our while to consider briefly the
nature of the decisions being reviewed and how these decisions
are or may be conceived of by courts.
Public health is the science of organizing social resources
against medical threats to the population. Public health decisions
are virtually always rooted in the science of medicine. They refer
to diseases whose natural history is or has been the subject of
medical study, to complex diagnostic or treatment technologies,
and to highly informed professional speculation in areas of exper-
iment or pure uncertainty.
Although rooted in medical science, the science of public
health operates in the translation of medical facts, assumptions
and educated guesses into programs that promote physical well-
being on a broad scale. Its practice, therefore, requires expertise
not just in disease, but also in social responses to disease. In the
AIDS epidemic, for example, developing a program of antibody
testing required public health officials both to quantify the accu-
racy of the available testing procedures, and to assess how various
testing regimes-anonymous, confidential, or mandatory-would
be received among those whose testing would be of benefit to
public health.2 11 Yet, even if decisions of that sort are not "techni-
cal" or "scientific" in a narrow sense, there are meaningful differ-
ences between such decisions as made by lay people and those
that are informed by professional values of objectivity, quantifica-
tion, neutrality, and the careful delineation of uncertainty.
As a cultural matter, our mistrust of experts coexists with a
belief in the miraculous power of science to cure the sick and pro-
tect the healthy. Decisions can credibly be assigned to "experts"
working within a scientific model on the basis of their supposed
29. See, e.g., R. BAYER, PRIVATE ACTS, SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES 104-23 (1989);
Letter to the Editor, Mlandatory Reporting of HIl Testing IVonld Deter Men from Being
Tested, 261 J. A.M.A. 1275 (1989); W.Johnson, F. Sy & K.Jackson, The Impact of
Mandatory Reporting of HIV Seropositive Persons in South Carolina !June 12,
1988) (unpublished paper presented at IV International Conference on AIDS,
Stockholm).
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neutrality: trained public health professionals, it is thought, avoid
decisions based on social, racial or interest group passions in
favor of quantifiable, utilitarian, "objective" goals and
considerations.
Yet, despite its kindly aura of white-coated technocracy,
"public health" is a highly political construct. In the broadest
sense, public health decisions are "political" in that the very un-
derstanding of a health problem, even if addressed in the terms of
science, is infused with value judgments. Public health, like ill-
ness, can be a metaphor.t 1 For instance, the perceived serious-
ness of a threat is frequently a function of the social subgroup the
disease threatens, a phenomenon of which AIDS has provided a
prime example. It took the federal government quite a bit longer
to recognize the HIV epidemic as a health emergency than to
grasp the seriousness of Legionnaire's Disease, largely because of
the perception of AIDS as a "gay plague."' I As AIDS becomes a
30. Seegenerally S. SONTAG, AIDS AND ITS METAPHORS (1988) (discussing so-
cial construction of AIDS through verbal imagery). Allen Brandt has described
one instance in the historical record of a disease whose natural history was ad-
justed in order to accommodate social needs: unwilling to implicate the middle
class in fornication, doctors identified pens, doorknobs, drinking cups and toilet
seats as vectors for the transmission of syphilis. An entire variety of the disease,
venereal insontium-venereal disease of the innocent-was invented. "The dis-
tinction between venereal disease and venereal insontium, of course, had the
effect of dividing victims: some deserved attention, sympathy, and medical sup-
port, others did not. By determining how the infection was obtained, doctors
separated victims into the 'innocent' and the 'guilty.' " Brandt, A Historical Per-
spective, in AIDS AND THE LAW: A GUIDE FOR THE PUBLIC 37, 38 (H. Dalton, S.
Burris & the Yale AIDS Law Project eds. 1987); see S. SONTAG, supra, at 53-55; see
also Musto, Quarantine and the Problem of AIDS, 64 MILBANK Q. 97, 108 (Supp. 1
1986).
The fear of a disease... arises not just from a reflection of the physio-
logical effects of a pathogen, but from a consideration of the kind of
person and habits which are thought to cause or predispose one to the
disease. Likewise, quarantine is a response not only to the actual mode
of transmission, but also to a popular demand to establish a boundary
between the kind of person so diseased and the respectable people who
hope to remain healthy.
Id.
31. R. SHILTS, AND THE BAND PLAYED ON 101, 109-10, 143-44, 186 (1987).
Shilts describes one measure of the fiscal response to AIDS, derived from a Con-
gressional Research Service comparative report:
The report found that in 1982, the National Institutes of Health's re-
search on Toxic Shock Syndrome, a mystery that had by then been
solved, amounted to $36,100 per death. NIH Legionnaire's spending
in the most recent fiscal year amounted to $34,841 per death. By con-
trast, the .health institute had spent about $3,225 per AIDS death in
fiscal 1981 and $8,991 in fiscal 1982. By NIH calculations, the life of a
gay man was worth about one-quarter that of a member of the Ameri-
can Legion.
Id. at 186.
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disease of the urban underclass, a further decay in the general
level of urgency is detectable.3 2
Medical decision makers are as prone as anyone else to biases
based on race, class and other characteristics. Moreover, the
medical culture has its own imperatives, and may overvalue, for
example, physicians' interests in professional autonomy to the
detriment of the public interest in informed consent and control
of private medical information. In any event, simply deciding
whether or not to act against a health problem, much less select-
ing from among remedial options, inevitably requires essentially
political judgments about the allocation of social resources, the
importance of human lives and human rights, and the relative
costs of different kinds of physical and emotional suffering.
Health officials, for instance, must assess the degree of dan-
ger posed by a health threat, but there is no objective scale for
weighting the identified costs. While it may be possible to predict
the death toll of one disease and the prevalence of another, there
is no equation for comparing them in seriousness. Is a disease
that kills ten people per year a more serious health problem than
one that cripples one hundred? The possible effects of a pro-
posed remedy-swine flu vaccine, for example-may be uncer-
tain. On what "scientific" basis does a health professional elect to
proceed with a large scale program despite the risk to those vacci-
nated? Similarly, a health measure such as pre-marital testing for
HIV might be compared to an education and intervention pro-
gram targeted at drug abusers through the use of a cost-benefit
analysis, but the decision that various remedies should be ana-
lyzed according to the amount of money spent per life saved pre-
supposes a political decision that all lives are equally valuable.
Among the relevant "costs" of a remedy will often be its impact
on individual rights. By what measure does a scientist compare
the intrusiveness of a blood test with a .002% reduction in
mortality?
Even among those who agree on the general seriousness of a
disease such as AIDS, identifying specific threats against which to
take action reflects prior choices of values or methodologies.
Health decisions, after all, are not always made by health officials.
Many traditional public health tools, such as compulsory contact
32. In Illness as Metaphor, Susan Sontag described the mental process by
which social fear of a serious disease was addressed by stigmatizing those who
contracted it. S. SONTAG, ILLNESS AS METAPHOR (1978). Conceiving of AIDS as a
punishment for drug use, poverty, or being a minority, creates a zone of safety
for the "general population" in which indifference to the epidemic can prosper.
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tracing or pre-marital screening, are disfavored by public health
experts, but have lost none of their lustre in the eyes of the gen-
eral public and its legislators."" Prostitutes have not been found
to be major vectors for HIV transmission in the United States,
and so have received relatively less attention as a target for public
health intervention than gay men and IV drug abusers.3 4 Among
many legislators, however, prostitutes, as archetypal "incorrigi-
ble" disease transmitters, have been regarded as a major public
health threat, either because of an unsupported belief that they
constitute a significant reservoir of infection or the conclusion
that even a small amount of new AIDS attributable to prostitutes
is unacceptable and ought to be prevented.3 5
Normal political rules are fully applicable in the area of pub-
lic health. Public health measures may be enacted for no other
reason than to satisfy a well-organized interest group. Exemplary
are provisions requiring the notification of ambulance workers
and other emergency medical personnel that an individual they
have already cared for has HIV disease.3 " Measures may be
passed purely because of their symbolic value. Pre-marital
33. The potential for conflict between lay and professional approaches to
disease control has never been greater. Arguably, the AIDS epidemic begins a
new era in public health practice, with its emphasis on cooperation rather than
confrontation between public health authorities and those affected by a commu-
nicable disease. See generally R. BAYER, supra note 29 (describing political and
social aspects of public health effort against AIDS). Before the development of
the germ theory of disease transmission, public health practice was, at best,
"crudely empirical," W. McNEIL, PLAGUES AND PEOPLES 209 (1976), based on
identifying and in some manner isolating the sick. See Musto., supra note 30, at
97. This approach to disease continues to be attractive to a large number of
people, if not a majority. See generally Blendon & Donelan, Discrimination Against
People with AIDS: The Publics Perspective, 319 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1022 (1988) (re-
porting poll results).
34. Rosenberg & Weiner, Prostitutes and AIDS: A Public Health Priority?, 78
AM.J. PUB. HEALTH 418 (1988); Seidlin, Krasinski, Bebenroth et al., Prevalence of
HI' Infection in Vew ]Vork Call Girls, I J. AIDS 150 (1988).
35. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-5- 3 (g) (Smith-Hurd 1982 &
Supp. 1988); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-34-10 (1981 & Supp. 1988); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 16-15-255 (Law Co-op. 1985 & Supp. 1988), WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 70.24.340(3) (Supp. 1989). See generally Gostin, Public Health Strategies for Con-
fronting AIDS: Legislative and Regulatory Policy in the United States, 261 J. A.M.A.
1621 (1989) (summarizing state law). This is consistent with the historical pat-
tern: in the great move against venereal diseases in the period of the First
World War, thousands of prostitutes (but few johns) were detained and quaran-
tined on the pure presumption that they were diseased. Brandt, supra note 30, at
40-41.
36. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1797.188 (West 1979 & Supp.
1989); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1111/-, para. 147.08 (Smith-Hurd 1988); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 23-28. 36-3 (Supp. 1988). See generally Gostin, supra note 35 (summariz-
ing state laws).
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screening for HIV antibodies is an example. Notwithstanding the
fact that screening would do little against the overall epidemic
except divert scarce resources from more effective measures,37 its
potential for identifying "innocent" people (like unwitting female
partners of secretly bisexual or drug-abusing males), and its sym-
bolic placement of AIDS in the same class as other sexually trans-
mitted diseases, created a strong base of political support.38
Obviously, there is a considerable overlap between the medi-
cal and political elements of public health decisions. There are
good reasons for placing these decisions in the hands of those
who have been trained to make them, and for requiring, as would
the behavioralist, that health decisions make medical sense. But
giving a decision to a technician does not make it a technical one.
Ultimately, there is no absolute distinction between the medical
and the political in health decisions. Instead, the concepts repre-
sent different ways of understanding the same phenomena, and
choosing one or the other is an act of privileging, not of descrip-
tion. In this sense, the most important step in the review of pub-
lic health decisions is deciding whether they should be
characterized as "political," "medical" or a hybrid of both. In the
remainder of this part, I will offer three simple models of the
health decision available to courts.9 '
Those who view the public health decision as entirely com-
mitted to the political branches of government would be expected
to adopt what we may call a classic "legislative" view. According
to this account, decisions are formed in a melting pot of horse-
37. See R. BAYER, supra note 29, at 145-46. The high cost of identifying
cases through pre-marital screening had fueled a trend to ending pre-marital
screening for venereal disease. Gostin, supra note 6, at 56.
38. As Ron Bayer described it:
That ... premarital screening would target populations with very low
levels of HIV infection, and that the pattern of premarital sexual rela-
tions in the United States made it unlikely that uninfected partners
could be protected by screening that occurred just prior to marriage
mattered less to the proponents of such a policy than the symbolic sig-
nificance of attempting to take any measure necessary to protect the
uninfected. The vision of women at the mercy of men who either wit-
tingly or not could infect them and the specter of infants born with
AIDS as the result of such unions-both of which had informed an-
tivenereal campaigns of the 1930s and 1940s-provided the impetus
behind calls for HIV antibody screening prior to marriage.
R. BAYER, supra note 29, at 145.
39. Much of the following is derived from Rodgers, Judicial Review of Risk
Assessments: The Role of Decision Theory in Unscrambling the Benzene Decision, I I
ENVTL. L. 301 (198 1). See also Diver, Policymaking Paradigms in Administrative Law,
95 HARV. L. REV. 393 (1981) (analyzing judicial models of administrative
decisionmaking).
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trading, compromise, interest-group pressure, political symbol-
ism, parliamentary maneuvering, expertise, ignorance and sleep
deprivation-in other words, anything may go into the decision as
long as the outcome is not blatantly discriminatory or unmistaka-
bly out of touch with reality. Under this view, one might openly
conceive of a health decision as having nothing to do with the
"real" medical facts, assuming such animals exist. A problem
might be targeted for action because it appears to pose a serious
risk to health or because it affects a powerful community, like
emergency medical workers. A remedy might be chosen because
it is medically effective, or because it has considerable political
symbolism, like pre-marital testing. Problems are identified, rem-
edies evaluated (or not) and actions selected by the rules of nor-
mal political practice. Thinking about decisions medically, or
conforming selections to medical advice, is entirely optional
(which is not to say that legislators will not claim that their polit-
ical decisions are based on medical imperatives). In a legislative
model, leaving aside the antidiscrimination principle, there are no
independent substantive limitations enforceable through judicial
review. As long as a health decision is justifiable on some ground,
there is no need to show that the decision was made in reliance
upon or in conformity with medical judgment.
At the other extreme is the "scientific" model, in which
health decisions are conceived of as highly technical, based as
much as possible upon objective medical evidence, and carried
out within a professional methodology in which the action ulti-
mately selected is closely correlated with the underlying medical
facts. A decision of this sort "to a large degree depend[s] upon
the identification of alternatives, the projection of consequences,
and the conscious selection of a 'best' decision.' 4 0 Such a deci-
sion is based on "hard" data, on cost-benefit analysis, and on risk
analysis. This model of the decision finds objectivity and other
scientific values not merely in the technical nature of the issues
addressed, but also in the process in which they are addressed.
Political and other non-technical considerations are not necessar-
ily excluded from consideration. If considered, however, they are
objectified as much as possible and, of course, they are consid-
ered within a deliberately non-political process. This is arguably,
the model of section 504.4 1
40. Rodgers, supra note 39, at 310; cf. Diver, supra note 39, at 396-97
(describing model of "comprehensive rationality").
41. See infra notes 47-65 and accompanying text.
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The inevitable middle-ground is occupied by a hybrid model,
which delineates decisions resolvable on medical grounds and
those better decided politically. The essential characteristic of
this. model in the public health sphere is the explicit recognition
of a relationship of limitation between the political and medical
worldviews. The nature of these limitations is a variable, an arbi-
trary but essential premise. Thus, in one version of the hybrid
decision model, the political places limitations on the medical
(e.g., public health officials are empowered to take such action as
their professional training dictates, subject to living within a
budget); or the opposite may be the case (e.g., politicians may
choose public health actions on any ground they like, but may
only choose from among those actions that are medically justifi-
able). This, I think, is the model suggested in the behavioral ac-
count of rationality review.42
We can see, even from this brief discussion, that what public
health "is" has no necessary connection to the style of its depic-
tion for purposes of judicial review. In describing health deci-
sions, we make fundamental choices about diseases and disease
control. As we look at the cases that follow, these rough models
will help us see those choices being made.
IV. CASES
For the behavioralist, the rationality of a challenged health
action depends on whether it is, in fact, medically reasonable in
public health terms. The appropriate standard of review, whether
it comes from law or a judge's cultural attitudes, is at least a hy-
brid, if not entirely scientific one. For the doctrinalist, the issue is
simply whether the state can provide any coherent explanation
for what is seen as a legislative decision. In this part, I examine
42. See infra notes 155-56 and accompanying text. If we ultimately accept
the view that the line between the political and the medical is artificial, then, of
course, we must hold that all that is ever happening in the world is some varia-
tion of the hybrid model. One could well argue, for example, that standard ra-
tional relationship review adopts a hybrid model, with the minimal necessity of a
logical connection between means and ends constituting a limitation on the
political. This misses the point, however, because the key issue on review of a
decision on any model is not the existence of a limitation (which inheres in the
very idea ofjudicial review) but the nature of that limitation. Moreover, it is well
to note that there is no requirement in the legal system that the formal model of
the decision being reviewed bear any relationship to the actual decision-making
process, so that the fact that all health decisions are ultimately composed of both
medical and political elements does not compel the judicial use of a hybrid
model.
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the scientific model selected in School Board v. Arline4' and Glover v.
Eastern Nebraska Community Office of Retardation,44 two cases of the
new public health law, and compare those choices with the model
used in Jacobson v. Massachusetts45 and City of New York v. New Saint
Mark's Baths,41 a pair of traditional public health cases. While this
will not tell us what courts ought to do, it will give us a clearer
way of talking about what they do do.
A. All Science by Law
School Board v. Arline began with the decision of a local school
board to fire a teacher with chronic tuberculosis. Although the
Supreme Court majority did not mention it, the board claimed
that its decision fulfilled, as the court of appeals put it, an "over-
riding duty to protect the public from contagious diseases.."47
The teacher, Gene Arline, sought relief under section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act, 48 which proscribes discrimination on the basis
of handicap against people who are "otherwise qualified" to par-
ticipate in a federally-funded program or activity, or who would
be qualified if the discriminator made a reasonable accommoda-
tion to the person's special needs. 4 1 Two questions were ad-
dressed: whether the Act applied to people with contagious
43. 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
44. 686 F. Supp. 243 (D. Neb. 1988), aft'd, 867 F.2d 461 (8th Cir. 1989).
45. 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
46. 130 Misc. 2d 911, 497 N.Y.S.2d 979 (Sup. Ct. 1986).
47. Arline v. School Bd., 772 F.2d 759, 761 (11 th Cir. 1985), aftd, 480 U.S.
273 (1987); cf. New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Carey, 612 F.2d
644, 648 (2d Cir. 1979) (discussing inherent conflict between requirements of
Act and traditional authority of school officials to protect students' health).
48. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982).
49. As in any discrimination case, the burden of proof ultimately rests with
the plaintiff. She must prove: (I) that she is handicapped as that is defined by
the Act; (2) that she is otherwise qualified for participation in the program or
activity; (3) that she is being excluded solely because of her handicap; and
(4) that the program or activity receives federal finds. Doe v. New York Univ.,
666 F.2d 761, 774-75 (2d Cir. 1981). The order of proof is usually thought to
track that of Title VII cases, see, e.g., Norcross v. Snead, 755 F.2d 113, 116-17
(8th Cir. 1985), although reasonable accomodation to the unique qualities of
§ 504 has sometimes been made. See Doe, 666 F.2d at 776-77. If a person is not
otherwise qualified, the court must also determine that no "reasonable accom-
modation" would make the person so. See, e.g., Martinez v. School Bd., 861 F.2d
1502, 1506 (11 th Cir. 1988). An accommodation of the handicap is "reason-
able" so long as it does not impose "undue financial and administrative bur-
dens," Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 412 (1979), or
require "a fundamental alteration in the nature of the program." Id. at 410; see
generally 45 C.F.R. § 84.12(c) (1988) (listing relevant factors for determining rea-
sonableness of accommodation).
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diseases at all, and, if so, what standards were appropriate to de-
termine whether such a person was "otherwise qualified."
The Court held as to the first question that there was no
doubt that contagious diseases could be handicaps under the Act.
Indeed, the methods and purposes of the Act made its application
to contagious diseases particularly apt. The goal of section 504,
the Court explained, was to "protect[] handicapped individuals
from deprivations based on prejudice, stereotypes, or unfounded
fear." 50 Noting that Congress had found "that society's accumu-
lated myths and fears about disease are as handicapping as are the
physical limitations that flow from actual impairment, -" 5 1 the
Court observed that "[flew aspects of a handicap give rise to the
same level of public fear and misapprehension as contagious-
ness." 52 The Act, therefore, required federal grantees-and
judges-to "replace ... reflexive reactions to actual or perceived
handicaps with actions based on reasoned and medically sound
judgments."53
One's sense that the Court was adopting (or discerning) a
"scientific" model of the health decision is enhanced by the
Court's test for determining whether an individual handicapped
by a contagious disease is "otherwise qualified." Having decided,
literally in passing, that the Act does not allow discriminatory
health actions unless the target poses at least a significant risk to
the public health5 4 (an important point to which I will return at
length in Part V), the Court instructed the district judge on re-
mand to determine himself whether Gene Arline posed such a
threat. The Court emphasized that an individualized medical in-
quiry and findings of fact were necessary "if § 504 is to achieve its
goal," 55 and, quoting verbatim from the amicus brief of the
50. Arline, 480 U.S. at 287.
51. Id. at 284.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 284-85. Congress ratified Adine's explanation of congressional
intent in the Civil Rights Restoration Act. Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987,
Pub. L. No. 100-259, § 9, 102 Stat. 28, 31-32 (1988) (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C.A. § 706(8)(c) (West Supp. 1989)).
54. See Arline, 480 U.S. at 287 n.16; accord Chalk v. United States Dist.
Court, 840 F.2d 701, 707-08 (9th Cir. 1988); Martinez v. School Bd., 861 F.2d
1502, 1506 ( 1th Cir. 1988). This had obviously been the view of earlier cases.
See, e.g., New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Casey, 612 F.2d 644 (2d
Cir. 1979); Kampmeier v. Nyquist, 553 F.2d 296 (2d Cir. 1977); District 27 Com-
munity School Bd. v. Board of Educ., 130 Misc. 2d 398, 502 N.Y.S.2d 325 (Sup.
Ct. 1986); see also Gostin, The Politics of.AIDS: Compulsoty State Powers, Public Health
and Civil Liberties, 49 OHio ST. L.J. 1017, 1020-21 (1987) (concept of significant
risk "well recognized" in public health law).
55. Arline, 480 U.S. at 287.
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American Medical Association (A.M.A.), it instructed the district
court that the risk assessment should be derived from
[findings ofn facts, based on reasonable medical judg-
ments given the state of medical knowledge, about
(a) the nature of the risk (how the disease is transmitted),
(b) the duration of the risk (how long is the carrier infec-
tious), (c) the severity of the risk (what is the potential
harm to third parties) and (d) the probabilities the dis-
ease will be transmitted and will cause varying degrees of
harm.5"
6
"In making these findings," Justice Brennan added, "courts
should normally defer to the reasonable medical judgments of
public health officials." 57
As interpreted by the Court, the Act imposes upon the judici-
ary an obligation to employ a scientific model of the health deci-
sion, which in turn requires states to justify health decisions
covered by the Act on a strictly medical basis. 58 The inquiry is
designed to find the "right" medical conclusion, with the assump-
tion being that trained health professionals are the ones to make
it. The judge is supposed to use the same criteria as the A.M.A.
would, minimizing the problems inherent in her lack of medical
training by maximizing her deference to health professionals.
Non-medical considerations are either to be excluded or folded
into the "scientific" model. 59
Arline is deferential to public health officials, but in a new and
interesting way. Notwithstanding the Court's view that deference
56. Id. at 288 (quoting Brief of American Medical Association as Amicus
Curiae at 19, School Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987) (No. 85-1277)).
57. Id.; accord Chalk, 840 F.2d at 708.
58. See Aritie, 480 U.S. at 287. The Court also noted:
The fact that some persons who have contagious diseases may pose a
serious health threat to others under certain circumstances does not
justify excluding from the coverage of the Act all persons with actual or
perceived contagious diseases. Such exclusion would mean that those
accused of being contagious would never have the opportunity to have
their condition evaluated in light of medical evidence and a determina-
tion made as to whether they were 'otherwise qualified.' Rather, they
would be vulnerable to discrimination on the basis of mythology-pre-
cisely the type of injury Congress sought to prevent.
Id. at 285 (emphasis in original).
59. Beyond the scope of this article but well worth keeping in mind is the
problem of prior findings of medical fact being treated as binding precedent by
courts even after the facts have changed. For an excellent discussion of this
problem, see Pine, Speculation atd Reality: /he Role of Facts in Judicial Protection of
Fundamental Rights, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 655 (1988).
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to health officials all but eliminates any potential for conflict be-
tween the Act and traditional public health law, the fit is not
nearly so neat. In adopting a "scientific" model of the decision,
the Court has moved its deference from the selection of policy,
where it principally resides in constitutional cases, to the assess-
ment of case-specific facts. This entails a drastic reduction in the
range of decisions to which a court will defer. Rarely in a health
case is there a dispute about the natural history of health threat;
even in AIDS cases, disputes of fact have not gotten past the dubi-
ous question of uncertainty-whether or not there are as yet un-
identified routes of transmission.t 1 In practice, given the
precision of medicine, the case will turn on policy decisions made
with reference to essentially undisputed facts.'" The real dispute
between Arline and her employers did not concern the duration,
transmission, and severity of tuberculosis-questions upon which
a medical consensus could be readily achieved-but was over the
acceptability of whatever level of risk she was determined to pres-
ent. 62 This is a question that does not become medical merely
60. See, e.g., Chalk, 840 F.2d at 707; Ray v. School Dist., 666 F. Supp. 1524,
1530, 1535 (M.D. Fla. 1987).
61. Under the Arline approach, health officials become technical advisors
providing raw material for the judicial policy-implementation process. This dis-
tinction between doctors as technicians and doctors as policy-makers had al-
ready been recognized in an early line of decisions dealing with school rules
preventing children with various physical impairments from playing sports. In
rejecting doctors' conclusions about whether the children should be allowed to
participate, courts differentiated between physicians' philosophical judgments
about the value of playing sports and their assessments of the actual risk of the
children's doing so. See, e.g., Grube v. Bethlehem Area School Dist., 550 F.
Supp. 418, 423 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
This distinction was also at work in Arline. Justice Rehnquist, dissenting,
pointed out that the school officials who had initiated Arline's termination had
relied on a private doctor's medical advice. 480 U.S. at 291 n.3 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting). The majority ignored this, going so far as to state that the case did
not present the question of whether a court should defer to the medical opinion
of a private doctor. Id. at 288 & n. 18. Clearly, the question was not deemed
presented because the physician made findings of law-policy-"philosophical"
judgments-rather than findings of fact. In Chalk, a similar AIDS case following
Arline, the converse situation arose. A teacher was barred from the classroom
despite the school board's doctor's recommendation that he be cleared for nor-
mal duty. Chalk, 840 F.2d at 703-04. The court of appeals did not order his
reinstatement in deference to the physician's conclusion, but instead evaluated
the medical evidence itself and applied the Arie test. Id. at 705-09.
62. This is particularly true in Rehabilitation Act cases, where the plaintiff
has to prove what in another public health case he might well be disputing: that
he has a communicable disease serious enough to limit him in one or more ma-
jor life activities. See 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2) (1988) (defining "handicapped per-
son" for purpose of Rehabilitation Act). On remand inArline, for example, there
was virtually no dispute on any of the medical issues involved in the "otherwise
qualified" analysis. Arline v. School Bd., 692 F. Supp. 1286 (M.D. Fla. 1988).
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because it is placed in medical hands. Yet, this basic policy deci-
sion has already been made: the Act requires that a teacher may
not be prevented from pursuing her career unless she presents a
significant risk as measured by medical standards.63
Under the Rehabilitation Act the notion of the state's police
power to protect the public health being an essential attribute of
state political sovereignty disappears. In Arline, the Court recon-
ceptualized the state's interest in preventing the spread of dis-
ease-generally regarded as the archetypal "compelling state
interest" withstanding the strictest level of scrutiny" 4-as a "legit-
imate concern[]" about "avoiding exposing others to significant
health and safety risks."6 5 Undoubtedly this is a sensible charac-
terization of the state's public health role, one that would be
shared by the vast majority of reasonable public health officials.
Obviously, too, it furthers the remedial intent of the Rehabilita-
tion Act. It is, in any event, within Congress' authority to impose
such a requirement upon the states. But one cannot say, without
more, that this creates no conflict with the state's authority to
make public health decisions as previously limited only by the
Constitution.
B. All Science by Choice
The Glover""' case arose out of the decision of the governing
board of the defendant Eastern Nebraska Community Human
Services Agency (ENHSA), a state agency providing residential
care for the developmentally disabled, to address a perceived risk
of transmission of communicable diseases from staff to clients.
After one employee died of AIDS, and two clients tested positive
(falsely, it turned out) for HIV antibodies, 6 7 the board voted to
require employees in positions involving extensive client contact
to undergo testing for Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV),
hepatitis B virus (HBV) and tuberculosis (TB)." The testing was
challenged as an unreasonable search and seizure.
63. For a more detailed discussion of risk issues, see infra notes 130-54 and
accompanying text.
64. See Note, Constitutional Rigts, supra note 7, at 1280; see also Doe v.
Coughlin, 71 N.Y.2d 48, 56, 518 N.E.2d 536, 541-42, 523 N.Y.S.2d 782, 788
(1987) (state interest obviously "substantial"), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 196 (1988).
65. Aihie, 480 U.S. at 287.
66. Glover v. Eastern Neb. Community Office of Retardation, 686 F. Supp.
243 (D. Neb. 1988), afftd, 867 F.2d 461 (8th Cir. 1989).
67. Id. at 247.
68. Id. at 245. The regulation also required employees to inform their em-
ployer ofany knowledge or suspicion they might have of their own infection with
954 [Vol. 34: p. 933
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The Supreme Court has said that "the over-riding function
of the Fourth Amendment [is] to protect personal privacy and
dignity against unwarranted intrusion by the state."'6 A search is
required to be "reasonable under all the circumstances,"-70 the
test focusing on whether the search was "justified at its inception"
and whether, as actually conducted, it was "reasonably related in
scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the
first place." 71 This all reduces to a balancing of competing inter-
ests, in which the state's obligation and authority to protect the
public health becomes an "interest" to be weighed against the
cost of the intrusion on individual rights.7 2
The leitmotif of the analysis is "reasonableness," a quality
which, like obscenity, the judge knows when she sees. Although
balancing of this kind arose out of ajudicial desire to objectify the
decision-making process,73 there is no clear definition of what
constitutes reasonableness, especially in an untried area like HIV
testing. A rough cost-benefit analysis generally provides a frame-
work, but the problem of weighting the inputs renders any objec-
tivity in the process rather tenuous.74 (Although there is no
"least restrictive means" requirement under the fourth amend-
ment, "a factor relevant to the inquiry into the reasonableness of
the search . . . would be whether less intrusive but equally effec-
tive means to the same goal are available." ' 75) Unlike the Rehabil-
itation Act, however, nothing in the text or history of the fourth
amendment suggests that "reasonableness" was specifically in-
a communicable disease, and to submit the records of any hospitalization of
treatment they underwent for such diseases. Id.
69. Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 760 (1985) (quoting Schmerber v. Cali-
fornia, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966)).
70. O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 725-26 (1987).
71. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985). The Gover court took
for granted that neither a warrant, probable cause, nor individualized suspicion
was required for this kind of testing scheme. It is not clear whether this flowed
from a prescient guess concerning the Supreme Court's drug testing cases, see
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402, 1413-21 (1989);
National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. 1384, 1390-98
(1989), or from the view that the testing so clearly failed the reasonableness test
that it was unnecessary to reach these more difficult questions.
72. O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 721; accord Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1414; Glover, 686
F. Supp. at 250.
73. Aleinikoff, Constitutional Low in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943,
958-63 (1987).
74. Id. at 974-76. See generally C. DUCAT, MODES OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTER-
PRETATION 116-92 (1978) (discussing balancing).
75. Transport Workers' Union, Local Union 234 v. Southeastern Pa.
Transp. Auth., 863 F.2d 1110, 1120-21 (3d Cir. 1988), vacated, 109 S. Ct. 3208
(1989).
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tended to require the judicial use of a scientific model of the
health decision. Indeed, the recent Supreme Court drug-testing
cases suggest that, at least in the realm of the administrative
search, fourth amendment "reasonableness" may be virtually
identical to the "rational basis" of the fifth and fourteenth
amendments. 76
The Glover court's evidentiary inquiry focused on the essen-
tial facts of AIDS and its transmission, the uses and limitations of
HIV testing in general, and the prevalence of biting, scratching,
and sexual and drug abuse in ENHSA facilities. There appears to
have been no serious dispute about the epidemiology of HIV and
HBV disease, 77 or the lack of a vaccine against the former and the
existence and availability to ENHSA of a vaccine against the lat-
ter.78 Most important, there was essentially no dispute about the
nature of the risk posed by HIV in the ENHSA facilities. The de-
fendants' case turned on the reasonableness of conducting highly
intrusive searches as a means of preventing the highly unlikely
occurrence of a catastrophic event.
The court was determined to root its decision in medical soil,
deferring whenever possible in its factfinding to the opinions of
public health officials. It found, for example, that "the medically
indicated reasons for HIV testing" were to help make a diagnosis
in the course of "the medical workup of a patient who may be
infected"; to determine prevalence in an epidemiological investi-
gation; and as part of a program of risk-reduction counseling and
behavioral modification among high risk group members. "Test-
ing in isolation as provided in [ENHSA]'s policy," the court
found, "does not serve these purposes." 711 Of course, a number
of states have chosen to use the test for reasons outside this list,
notably in the mandatory testing of people arrested or convicted
of sex crimes and prostitution.8Y There was no serious discussion
of why ENHSA was not entitled to use the test for a valid purpose
not contemplated by doctors.
The court also discussed the evidence presented on risk
levels and risk reduction techniques among health care workers,
an analogous risk group to the plaintiffs:
76. See Skinner, 109 S. Ct. 1402; I'on Raab, 109 S. Ct. 1384.
77. The plaintiffs did not challenge the TB policy. Glover, 686 F. Supp. at
244 n. 1.
78. Id. at 246-47.
79. Id. at 248.
80. See supra notes 34-35.
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These recommendations and guidelines do not include,
nor is there any evidence that health care workers ... are
routinely screening for the presence of HIV. That these
recommendations and guidelines are apparently effec-
tive is evidenced by the fact that health care workers,
although theoretically at a higher risk than the general
public, have few reported incidents of HIV transmission
as a result of their jobs.81
The court did not explain why, in selecting the manner and mode
of its public health effort at ENHSA, the state was limited only to
those prophylactic measures approved by the CDC.
Based on its finding, expressed in a manner allowing no ap-
pellate inference of uncertainty, that the risk of transmission at
the facility was "minuscule, trivial, extremely low, extraordinarily
low, theoretical, and approach[ing] zero," 82 the court held that
81. Glover, 686 F. Supp. at 249. The court's view of the evidence is also
interesting in the way it shows a willingness to consider the consistency and co-
herence of the state's behavior in examining the reasonableness of the state's
analysis of the seriousness of the problem and its selection of a remedy. The
court found that ENHSA's rationale for selecting the positions for which testing
would be a requirement was that the positions involved extensive client contact.
It noted that the evidence showed that staff members in non-tested positions
had also been bitten or scratched by clients. Moreover, although the state had
relied rather heavily on the fact that an employee actually died of AIDS, ENHSA
had not followed up by testing clients who had been involved in biting or
scratching incidents with the employee, or otherwise informing them or their
guardians of a possible risk. Id. at 248-49.
Normally the fact that a state addresses only one part of problem, or is
otherwise inconsistent or incomplete in its action, is not something that goes to
the validity of the action. See, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 487
(1970); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson 316 U.S. 535, 540 (1942). There
is some precedent in health cases, however, for Glover's approach. In New York
State Ass'i for Retarded Children v. Carey, Judge Newman sidestepped the general
rule by distinguishing a measure allocating benefits from a measure designed to
prevent a specific threat of significant harm. In Carev, which concerned an effort
to limit school attendance of children with HBV, the court found the
lack of any evidence that a serious possibility of transmission existed ...
[was] underscored by the [School] Board's own failure to make any
comprehensive plan based on its own assessment of the situation. Spe-
cifically, the Board made no effort to identify all the children in the
public schools, or even all the retarded children in the public schools,
who might be carriers of hepatitis B. Instead, it merely tested the 450
children who happened to be in classrooms that included known hepa-
titis B carriers, a policy that casts doubt on the Board's sense of how
critical the problem was. . . . [Such an approach,] if not necessarily
impermissible, at least suggests that the Board did not regard its own
evidence of risk as particularly convincing.
Carey, 612 F.2d 644, 650 (2d Cir. 1979); see also Jew Ho v. Williamson, 103 F. 10
(C.C.N.D. Cal. 1900) (invalidating quarantine applied only to ethnic Chinese
homes and not to adjoining European dwellings).
82. Glover, 686 F. Supp. at 251.
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the testing was not justified at its inception. Implicitly adopting a
significant-risk standard, it stated that "from a medical viewpoint,
this policy is not necessary to protect clients from any medical
risks."8 3 Having elected sub rosa to evaluate risk against a medi-
cal scale, the court did not weight heavily "testimony . . . that
there can be no guarantee that the [ENHSA] clients could not
possibly contract the AIDS virus, and thus the policy is necessary
because of the devastating consequences of the disease."' 4 The
defendants, the court explained, were "simply asking this Court
to approve their policy because it is better to be safe than
sorry."81 15 Although it did not hold that the state was never enti-
tled to take action aimed at eliminating all risk of transmission,
the court weighted the state's interest in achieving that risk level
in terms of its marginal medical benefit; that quantum of medical
benefit being virtually nil, the testing's benefits did not outweigh
the high cost to individual rights.8"
The essence of Glover's holding, like Arline's, is that the state
cannot do what millions of people elect to do every day: avoid
risks subjectively identified as unacceptable. It cannot elect to be
safe rather than sorry. The state is limited to addressing risks
found to be significant in a medical analysis, at least where the
prophylactic has a cost in human rights, no matter how unpalat-
able lesser risks might be to decision-makers and the public. Just
as in Arline, the court's discussion of risk did not address the polit-
ical component of public health actions. As in Arline, the court
did not consider that deference to reasonable medical judgment
is only deference to the state if the state was making a medical
judgment in the first place. Unlike Arline, however, the court was
not obeying a congressional policy decision. In section 504, Con-
83. Id. at 249. The court came to the same conclusion with respect to test-
ing for HBV, adding that even if there were evidence of a significant risk, HBV
testing would be unjustified because of the availability of immunization and ef-
fective treatment. Id. at 251.
84. Id.
85. Id. Ironically, the court found that ENHSA's "philosophy recognizes
the dignity of risk, thus permitting its clients to live life with all its inherent risks,
as they live in a community setting." Id. at 245.
86. Id. at 251 ("ITlhe Executive Director ... stated that his paramount
concern was to 'protect clients at all cost.' This approach is impermissible for 'at
all cost' in this case includes the violation of plaintiffs' constitutional rights.").
Of course, the case could have gone off quite differently had the court decided
that, for example, workers providing care for retarded people do not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in their medical condition. See, e.g., Police-
man's Benevolent Ass'n, Local 318 v. Township of Washington, 850 F.2d 133
(3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1637 (1989); Shoemaker v. Handel. 795
F.2d 1136 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 986 (1986).
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gress decided that health decisions covered by the Act should be
made on a medically reasonable basis. In Glover, the court found
the same restriction in the text of the Constitution. Thus the
court established that the judicially-crafted standard of reasona-
bleness places substantive medical limitations on state health pol-
icy prerogatives. 87 The notable thing about Glover, then, is not
that the court closely scrutinized the testing program-in a fourth
amendment case, after all, the burden is on the state to persuade
the court that its testing is reasonable""-but that reasonableness
was defined exclusively in medical terms, the problem being the
state's failure to arrive at the correct medical answer. The district
court unselfconsciously used, and the court of appeals without
discussion adopted, a purely scientific model of the health
decision.
C. Some Science for Some Reason
Given the sweep of section 504's coverage, and the frequency
with which case-identification measures involve blood testing, a
substantial proportion of health cases in the age of AIDS will be
decided on grounds other than the fourteenth amendment. That
it is the rule, or practice, in these "new" public health cases to
treat the health decision as a medical one, and to require a rea-
87. It is worth noting that the explicit or implicit adoption of a significant
risk standard under § 504 and the fourth amendment is quite like judicial rea-
soning about health decisions under other statutory/regulatory regimes. In the
well-known benzene case, Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petro-
leum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980), the Court was faced with an OSHA decision to
require the lowest occupational level of exposure to benzene, a carcinogen, that
was technologically and economically possible. Id. at 613. The Court, noting
that the decision to require the lowest possible level of exposure was not based
on any finding that
leukemia has ever been caused by exposure to 10 ppm of benzene and
that it will not be caused by exposure to I ppm, but rather on a series of
assumptions indicating that some leukemias might result from expo-
sure to 10 ppm and that the number of cases might be reduced by re-
ducing the exposure level to I ppm,
invalidated the standard. Id. at 634. The plurality explained that the Act pre-
supposed the OSHA, before setting an exposure standard, would make a finding
that such a standard was necessary to make the workplace safe. Id. at 642. But,
the plurality further noted
safe is not the equivalent of 'risk-free.' There are many activities that
we engage in every day-such as driving a car or even breathing city
air-that entail some risk of accident or material health impairment;
nevertheless, few people would consider these activities 'unsafe.' Simi-
larly, a workplace can hardly be considered 'unsafe' unless it threatens
the workers with a significant risk of harm.
Id.
88. See, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341-42 (1985).
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sonable medical basis for state action, does not compel the con-
clusion that such behavior is proper in "traditional" challenges
claiming denial of equal protection or substantive due process.
On the contrary, even accepting the foregoing account of public
health review under other legal regimes, the doctrinalist would
find no basis for departure from the generally-applied rules of
fourteenth amendment rationality review.
Traditional public health law undoubtedly states a rule of ex-
treme deference compatible with the loosest examples of rational
basis scrutiny in contemporary constitutional law. On the level of
rhetoric at least, courts use a legislative model of the decision,
with the emphasis on the state's political freedom to do its protec-
tive duty in whatever way it sees fit. In practice, however, tradi-
tional health decisions, both past and present, focus far more
than contemporary minimum scrutiny doctrine would allow on
the actual medical validity of the challenged health action in the
specific context in which it has been applied."! ' While a complete
account of public health law, much less a revisionist one, has yet
to be written, close readings of the classic traditional public
health case, Jacobson v. Massachusetts,!' and a contemporary case,
City of New York v. New Saint Mark's Baths, 'l suggest that a hybrid
model is used, under which specific scrutiny of health actions'
medical bases frequently limits legislative prerogatives.
On a casual reading, Jacobson appears to embody pure defer-
ence to legislative health decisions. Mr. Jacobson was a citizen of
Cambridge, charged criminally for refusing to submit to a general
smallpox vaccination program ordered by the town board of
health9 2 As part of his defense, he offered to prove that vaccina-
tion was both ineffective and dangerous as a public health mea-
sure.!' The state trial court and the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts both rejected his proffer. In its affirmance, the
United States Supreme Court eliminated any lingering doubt
about the state's general authority to act in the name of public
health, setting forth a vision of a virtually unlimited police power
that trumped individual rights to the full extent necessary to pro-
tect the public. No person, the Court explained, had a right to
endanger the community.
89. For authorities analyzing actual practice in health cases, see supra note11.
90. 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
91. 130 Misc. 2d 911, 497 N.Y.S.2d 979 (Sup. Ct. 1986).
92. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 13.
93. Id. at 36.
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Public health was recognized as an essential duty of local
government, whose exercise was subject to only limited judicial
check. Moreover, discretion in selecting the manner and mode of
such action appeared to be reserved entirely to the People, to be
exercised on whatever basis they chose. The Court declared the
right of the people to adopt such health measures as were held by
common belief to be effective, adding that "common belief, like
common knowledge, does not require evidence to establish its
existence, but may be acted upon without proof by the legislature
and the courts.' ' 4
On a closer reading, recognizing the degree to which the de-
cision reflects turn-of-the-century legal and cultural norms, its
deference appears less complete. Jacobson, it must be recalled,
was a product of the Lochner Court; its deferential language must
be read in light of the Court's willingness to engage in close scru-
tiny of the actual value of vaccination as a health measure. 95 In
fact, the Court's reliance on the People's right to choose vaccina-
tion as a health measure actually had more to do with the over-
whelming social consensus that vaccination was medically
valuable than a view that the medical bona fides of a health action
were irrelevant.
Jacobson's principal ground for appeal was the trial court's
decision not even to admit his evidence against vaccination. This
decision, however, was not based on the view that the value of
vaccination was irrelevant to Jacobson's defense. The Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts, in a portion of its opinion quoted
by the United States Supreme Court, explained that the proffers,
even accepted as true, would not change the results: the trial
judge would merely have had to instruct the jury to consider this
testimony along with "facts of common knowledge," including
that
for nearly a century most of the members of the medical profes-
sion have regarded vaccination as a preventative of small-
94. Id. at 35 (quoting Viemeister v. White, 179 N.Y. 235, 240, 72 N.E. 97,
99 (1904)).
95. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). See Karst, 'accination, in 4
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 1953, 1953 (L. Levy, K. Karst &
D. Mahoney eds. 1986) ("For the majority who found a violation of substantive
due process in Lochner's sixty-hour limit on bakers' weekly work but validated
compulsory vaccination, the difference surely was that they saw vaccination as a
soundly based health requirement." (emphasis omitted)). See also Tribe, Substan-
live Due Process, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 1798, 1798-
99 (1986) (discussing Lochner).
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pox; that, while they have recognized the possibility of
injury to an individual from carelessness in the perform-
ance of it, or even in a conceivable case without careless-
ness, they generally have considered the risk of such
injury too small to be seriously weighed as against the
benefits coming from the discreet and proper use of the
preventative; and that not only the medical profession
and the people generally have for a long time enter-
tained these opinions, but legislatures and courts have
acted upon them with general unanimity. If the defendant
had been permitted to introduce such expert testimony as he had in
support of these general propositions, it could not have changed
the results.'11
In a similar vein the Supreme Court said:
[Jacobson's] offers in the main seem to have had no pur-
pose except to state the general theory of those of the
medical profession who attach little or no value to vacci-
nation as a means of preventing smallpox or who think
that vaccination causes other disease of the body. What
everybody knows the court must know, and therefore the
state court judicially knew, as this court knows, that an
opposite theory accords with the common belief and is
maintained by high medical authority.97
Jacobson was not based on the irrelevance of medical facts but
on the overwhelming medical support for smallpox vaccination.
Indeed, the value of vaccination was so firmly established that the
Court was able to judicially notice it. In more than two pages of
footnotes, the Court cited encyclopedia articles, government re-
ports, case decisions and international legislation for the proposi-
tion that vaccination was widely accepted as a valuable public
health tool against smallpox.98 A rule that the people may do
anything they like against disease without reference to medical ev-
idence is far broader than was needed to decide the case, and cer-
tainly would not have required the Court even to discuss, much
96. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 23-24 (quoting Commonwealth v. Pear, 183 Mass.
242, 246-47, 66 N.E. 719, 721 (1903), aff'd, 197 U.S. 11 (1905)) (emphasis
added).
97. Id. at 30 (emphasis added).
98. Id. at 31-34 n.l.
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less judicially notice,9 9 any medical evidence at all. °10
Any interpretation of Jacobson discerning categorical defer-
ence is also undermined by its attention to the particular facts of
the defendant's case. Indeed, Jacobson's essential tactical mis-
take, as the Court itself hinted, was his failure to sufficiently par-
ticularize his attack. The Court identified several factual claims
not made by Jacobson that might have compelled a different out-
come, including whether or not smallpox actually posed a current
threat to the town and the suggestion that the law would be un-
constitutional if applied to a person who could prove actual likeli-
hood of harm to himself.
Under the doctrinal view of minimum scrutiny of health ac-
tions,Jacobson's willingness to consider the actual medical reason-
ableness of a health measure would now be incorrect, but it was
proper under the doctrinal regime within which the Jacobson
Court was operating. The Court's decision drew on the idea that
the exercise of the police power is grounded in "the principle of
self-defense, of paramount necessity."""' In the latter part of the
nineteenth century, the concept of necessity 2 was a linchpin of a
definitional analysis of the police power.'" 3 For example, in an
Illinois case invalidating vaccination where there was no evidence
that the disease was present, the court said:
The power to compel vaccination . . . can be derived
from no other source than the general police power of
the state, and can be justified upon no other ground than
99. Extensive use of judicial notice and exclusion of defendant's proffers
was undoubtedly a questionable way to gather evidence. While the perceived
gap between lay and professional competence has, if anything, widened, the mis-
use ofjudicial notice remains a problem. See Davis, "There is a Book Out... "." An
Analysis of Judicial Absorption of Legislative Facts, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1539 (1987).
One does not quite know what to make of a decision that relied for its medical
facts, as did one otherwise fine AIDS decision, on Readers Digest. See Ray v.
School Dist., 666 F. Supp. 1524, 1530 (M.D. Fla. 1987).
100. It is also important to recognize thatJacobson came at a time when the
perceived gap between the physician's and lay person's understanding of disease
and disease prevention was still narrow. See Burris, Fear Itself, supra note 9, at
485-86.
101. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 27; see Reznick, Empiticism and the Pinciple of Condi-
tions in the Evolution of the Police Power: A Alodelfor Definitional Scrutiny, 1978 WASH.
U.L.Q 1, 51-53 (discussingJacobson).
102. Or, as it has recently been called, the theory of "conditions." Reznick,
supra note 101, at 2.
103. See E. FREUND, THE POLICE POWER: PUBLIC POLICY AND CONSTITU-
TIONAL RIGHTS (1904) (leading treatise on police power); Reznick, supra note
101. See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 15, §§ 8-1 to -4 (discussing constitutional
model of implied limits on government).
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as a necessary means of preserving the public health.
Without the necessity, or reasonable grounds upon
which to conclude that such necessity exists, the power
does not exist. 0 4
This approach reflects the view that an exercise of state
power could not be reviewed for matters of degree. As Professor
Ernst Freund, a leading commentator quoted in Jacobson,
explained:
The earlier attitude ... seems to have been that if it was
acknowledged that a condition consisted for legislative
action, the legislature was sole and conclusive judge
(under specific constitutional limitations) to what degree
its power could be exercised. So it was said in Brown v.
Maryland: "Questions of power do not depend upon the
degree to which it may be exercised. If it may be exer-
cised at all, it must be exercised at the will of those in
whose hands it is placed. ' 105
By the time of Jacobson, however, this view had been tempered to
the extent that, in addition to considering whether "a condition
exist[s] which justifies any legislative action,"' )1 a court was also
thought to be empowered to consider the proportionality of the
exercise of the authority in relation to the condition which justi-
fied it. 107
This theory that exercise of the police power was contingent
upon the actual necessity for action suggests the importance of
Jacobson's sua sponte notation of the absence of a claim that small-
pox was not prevalent in Cambridge, 108 and explains this other-
wise curious passage in which it elaborates upon the concept:
Smallpox being prevalent and increasing at Cambridge,
the court would usurp the functions of another branch of
government if it adjudged, as a matter of law, that the
mode adopted under sanction of the State, to protect the
people at large, was arbitrary and not justified by the ne-
cessities of the case. We say necessities of the case, be-
cause it might be that an acknowledged power of a local
104. Potts v. Breen, 167 Ill. 67, 74, 47 N.E. 81, 84 (1897).
105. E. FREUND, supra note 103, § 63, at 58 (quoting Brown v. Maryland, 12
U.S. (1 Wheat.) 419, 439 (1827)).
106. Id. § 63, at 60.
107. Id. § 63, at 60-61.
108. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 27.
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community to protect itself against an epidemic threat-
ening the safety of all, might be exercised in particular
circumstances and in reference to particular persons in
such an arbitrary, unreasonable manner, or might go so
far beyond what was reasonably required for the safety
of the public, as to authorize or compel the courts to in-
terfere for the protection of such persons. 1'
The rule of Jacobson is not one of categorical deference to a
state's political decisions, or even its medical determinations, re-
gardless of evidence tending to falsify them. Rather,Jacobson held
that the commitment of health decisions to the politkal branches
entitles the state to proceed unimpeded with necessary actions
bearing a reasonable medical relation to a demonstrable health
threat. This rule obviously does not contemplate the state acting
in a manner that is not medically justifiable, no matter how politi-
cally compelling the action might be. It therefore imposes a med-
ical limitation on the state's health power, indicating the Court's
adoption of a hybrid, rather than purely legislative, model of the
health decision.
The question is, then, precisely how much ofJacobson remains
viable?' 'o Lochner is gone, and with it the approach to judicial re-
view upon whichJacobson rested. Arguably, the idea that a public
health measure must be supported by medical evidence, while
eminently reasonable, derogates from the broad freedom of ac-
tion currently accorded states under the rational basis test.' '
109. Id. at 28; see, e.g., State v. Rackowski, 86 Conn. 677, 680, 86 A. 606,
608 (1913) (police power's "origin rests in necessity"); cf People ex rel. Barmore
v. Robertson, 302 Il1. 422, 433, 134 N.E. 815, 819 (1922) ("health regulations
are all sustained on the law of necessity, and when the necessity ceases the right
to enforce the regulations ceases"); In re Smith, 146 N.Y. 68, 73, 40 N.E. 497,
498 (1895) (if police power is exercised, "it must appear very clearly and satis-
factorily, not only that [the right to act] has been conferred by the law, but also
that in its exercise the facts were present which justified it").
110. Its specific suggestion that the decision might have gone the other way
had there been no evidence of an actual smallpox epidemic in Cambridge was
obviated by the decision 18 years later in Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174 (1922),
that vaccination could be required even in the absence of an immediate threat of
epidemic.
111. Naturally, a pure legislative model of the decision is difficult to main-
tain given the obvious medical quality of at least some aspects of the public
health decision. As Professor Davis has observed in the context of administra-
tive law, there is a meaningful difference between rules grounded primarily in
policy preferences-such as tax rules-and those which depend for their reason-
ableness on facts-such as a decision of the Consumer Products Safety Commis-
sion to ban a toy as dangerous. I K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE
§ 6:13, at 510-13 (2d ed. 1978). The acceptance of medicine as a science, refer-
ring to a universe of verifiable facts, has contributed to the willingness of courts
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Does not a judicial decision that it is not better to be safe than
sorry ultimately commit the sin of Lochner, with the Centers for
Disease Control's (CDC) opinions on appropriate health meas-
ures replacing "Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics"? 1 12 The doc-
trine of necessity, seeking a limitation on state action in the
nature of the police power itself, rather than primarily in the af-
firmative protections of state and federal constitutions, is, to say
the least, out of fashion.
Yet even if its doctrinal basis has eroded,Jacobson's approach
has continued to be the model for health cases. The language of
necessity appears in public health decisions into the modern
era.'' Moreover, public health cases continue to focus on the
to intrude in health matters. I suspect that public health cases often appear to
judges to involve matters more verifiable than challenges to more general social
or economic legislation. See, e.g., Turkington, Constitutional Limitations on Tort Re-
form: Have the State Courts Placed Insurowuntable Obstacles in the Path of Legislative
Responses to the Perceived Liability Insurance Crisis?, 32 VILL. L. REV. 1299, 1310-13
(1987) (discussing lack of meaningful review of tort reform decisions under ra-
tional basis test). The epidemiology of most diseases is now well understood.
The manner of transmission of all but three percent of AIDS cases has been
investigated and identified with reasonable certainty by a highly respected, pro-
fessionally impeccable agency of the federal government charged with precisely
that task. See Centers for Disease Control, HIV/AIDS Surveillance Report 8
(Feb. 1989), The issue is the subject of countless scientific papers by leading
researchers and clinicians. See Editorial, Heterosexual Transmission of Human lmmu-
iodeficiencv lirus, 260J. A.M.A. 1943 (1988); Special Initiative on AIDS, Ameri-
can Public Health Association, Casual Contact and the Risk of HI!' Infection, (July
1988). Claims that there might be some other way we do not know about, while
perhaps not laughable, are certainly not colorable. Lifson, Do Alternate Modes of
Transmission of Human Immunodeftciencv Virus Evist?, 259 J. A.M.A. 1353 (1988).
Even the efficacy of various prophylactic measures, while perhaps less so, are
nevertheless fairly verifiable, either because they have been directly studied in
connection with other diseases (e.g., pre-marital testing for disease) or because
so much is known about the transmission of the disease and the remedy (using
condoms-we know the disease is spread sexually, we know how often condoms
leak). Even issues dependent on behavior-will people use the condoms, what
will addicts do with free needles-have been or can be studied. The availability
of such information militates against judicial deference to post hoc or a priori,
state claims about the fit between means and ends.
112. See Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955) (discussing
deferential review); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
113. See, e.g., Schuringa v. City of Chicago, 30 Ill. 2d 504, 509, 198 N.E.2d
326, 329 (1964) ("a police measure, to be beyond the pale of constitutional infir-
mity, must bear a reasonable relation to the public health or other purposes
sought to be served, the means being reasonably necessary and suitable for the
accomplishment of such purpose"), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 964 (1965); Moyant v.
Borough of Paramus, 30 N.J. 528, 544, 154 A.2d 9, 17 (1959) ("[wjhere the
police power has been granted to a municipal corporation, it is elementary that
it can be exercised only in those areas where regulation is needful for the com-
mon good"); see also Gostin, supra note !1, at 480-81 (discussing concept of ne-
cessity in modern cases).
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facts specific to a particular action in the context in which the at-
tack has arisen. Cases in which courts have essentially refused to
attend medical evidence,' 14 or have upheld laws based on
"health" claims supported only by transparent generalizations,' '5
have been a minority. The common practice, even in opinions
claiming that the existence of doubt or alternatives is irrelevant, is
to gather and weigh carefully often voluminous amounts of fac-
tual evidence.' I6 Under this view, Arline's insistence on deference
to the views of reasonable public health officials is part of a long
tradition in public health cases.
We see this in one of the few recent health cases decided on
constitutional grounds,' 17 City of New York v. New Saint Mark's
Baths.'' 8 Saint Mark's was a suit by New York City health authori-
ties to close down a gay bathhouse under the city's Nuisance
Abatement Law. Public health officials were sharply divided
114. See, e.g., Kirk v. Wyman, 83 S.C. 372, 65 S.E. 387 (1909) (upholding
quarantine of non-contagious leper).
115. See, e.g., Mayor of Baltimore v. Fairfield Improvement Co., 87 Md. 352,
365, 39 A. 1081, 1084 (1898) (enjoining placement of leper with family in devel-
oping neighborhood because of general fear it would provoke and because of
the risk of contagion, and rejecting "mere scientific asseveration and conjec-
ture" that disease not readily transmitted).
116. See, e.g., Schringa, 30 II1. 2d at 507, 198 N.E.2d at 328 (matter referred
to master, who held "prolonged hearings" and considered "a voluminous rec-
ord"); Attaya v. Town of Gonzales, 192 So. 2d 188 (La. Ct. App. 1966) (record
included numerous depositions and "a considerable volume" of scientific infor-
mation and studies); Paduano v. City of New York, 45 Misc. 2d 718, 724, 257
N.Y.S.2d 531, 538 (Sup. Ct.) (900-page record plus mass of documentary evi-
dence), aff'd, 24 A.D.2d 437, 260 N.Y.S.2d 831 (1965), aff'd, 17 N.Y.2d 875, 218
N.E.2d 339, 211 N.Y.S.2d 305 (1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1026 (1967); Kraus v.
City of Cleveland, 55 Ohio Op. 6, 116 N.E.2d 779 (C.P. 1953) (trail, extensive
affidavits and 275 pages of congressional hearing testimony), af'd, 55 Ohio Op.
36, 121 N.E.2d 311 (Ct. App. 1954), aff'd, 163 Ohio St. 559, 127 N.E.2d 609
(1955), appeal dismnissed, 351 U.S. 935 (1956); see also Graybeal v. McNevin, 439
S.W.2d 323 (Ky. 1969); Chapman v. City of Shreveport, 225 La. 859, 74 So. 2d
142, appeal dismissed, 348 U.S. 892 (1954); cf Huffman v. District of Columbia, 39
A.2d 558 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1944) (upholding laws and regulations aimed at
controlling communicable disease as having "a direct relation as a means" to
legitimate end, but reversing appellant's conviction of refusing to submit to an
exam because of lack of evidence that she was infected, refusal of trial court to
allow scientific evidence of her health, and lack of emergency to justify summary
action).
117. See, e.g., Doe v. Coughlin, 71 N.Y.2d 48, 518 N.E.2d 536, 523 N.Y.S.2d
782 (1987) (denial of conjugal visits to inmate with AIDS), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct.
196 (1988); California v. Three 3 MCS, Inc., No. C685816 slip. op. (Cal. Super.
Ct. Aug. 30, 1988) (challenge to closing of bathhouse); California ex rel. Agnost
v. Owen, No. 830 321 (Cal. Super. Ct. Nov. 30, 1984) (same); cf New York Soc'y
of Surgeons v. Axelrod, 200 N.Y.L. 1. No. 96, at 29 (Sup. Ct. 1988) (rejecting
plaintiff's attempt to force state health official to declare HIV a transmissible
disease).
118. 130 Misc. 2d 911, 497 N.Y.S.2d 979 (Sup. Ct. 1986).
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about whether or not closing bathhouses was a good idea. It was
likely that high-risk behavior would merely move somewhere else,
and the baths at least offered an opportunity for reaching and ed-
ucating those most at risk.' 9 Rights of association and privacy
were implicated by closure; and the symbolic importance of the
baths in the gay liberation movement, with the correlative threat
to gay cooperation with public health efforts posed by closure,
raised the potential cost of action even when measured in purely
public health terms.' 20 On the other hand, there were reasonable
public health officials who were prepared to assert that closing the
baths would probably reduce overall transmission, and it was in-
contestable and uncontested that unsafe sex acts were occurring
in the baths that would not occur there if the baths were
closed. ' 2 '
New York City's health commissioner had long been among
the most vocal opponents of bathhouse closure, but political pres-
sure at the state level eventually led to a change of mind, if not of
heart. t'2 2 New York City health department investigators were
sent into the baths to confirm that sexual activities of a kind likely
to spread HIV were occurring, whereupon the city sought an or-
der for closure, citing a new state regulation declaring facilities
where such unsafe sex was taking place to be nuisances.' 2 3 The
city was opposed by the defendant owners, bolstered by a group
of intervening patrons, all asserting rights of privacy and freedom
of association.
At the outset of its opinion, the court spoke of the state's
"compelling state interest," which sweeps away the defendants'
and intervenors' rights of privacy and free association, "provided,
as here, it is also shown that the remedy adopted is the least intru-
119. See R. BAYER, supra note 29, at 65-66.
120. See generally R. BAYER, supra note 29; R. SHILTS, supra note 31; Burris,
Fear Itself, supra note 9, at 508-14. Similar arguments against closure were
presented in other bathhouse cases. They did not prove convincing in the Los
Angeles case, California v. Three 3 MCS, Inc., No. C685816 slip. op. (Cal. Sup.
Ct. Aug. 30, 1988). In the San Francisco case, however, where the trial judge
recognized a privacy interest, these arguments helped secure an order allowing
the baths to remain open with certain limitations and modifications. California
ex rel. Agnost v. Owen, No. 830 321 (Cal. Super. Ct. Nov. 30, 1984); see also Note,
Constitutional Rights, supra note 7, at 1284-86 (discussing review of bathhouse clo-
sures). For a general discussion of the bathhouse issue, see Note, Preventing the
Spread, supra note 7.
121. Some political leaders, like Diane Feinstein of San Francisco, regarded
it as a basic duty of government to prevent specific acts of transmission occur-
ring in facilities it licensed. See R. BAYER, supra note 29, at 31-38.
122. Id. at 54-64.
123. Saint .1Iarks, 130 Misc. 2d at 914, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 981.
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sive reasonably available." 124 Having concluded that even if strict
scrutiny applied, the state had made the requisite factual showing
to justify closure, the court spent several paragraphs explaining
why the defendants and intervenors probably did not have any
rights that would trigger heightened scrutiny after all (because
the baths were commercial, because the intervenors were not pre-
vented from having sex elsewhere, because sexual activity is not a
protected associational right).125 Finally, the court completed its
reversion to deference by dredging up the hoary maxim that "[i]t
is not for the courts to determine which scientific view is correct
in ruling upon whether the police power has been properly exer-
cised. The judicial function is exhausted with the discovery that
the relation between means and end is not wholly vain and fanci-
ful, an illusory pretense."' 26
Notwithstanding its "total scrutiny" approach, 2 7 Saint Mark's
is actually a good representative of a traditional health decision,
and the mark of its affinity is none other than its supposed resolve
not to scrutinize the state's chosen measure beyond the point of
determining that it bore a medically rational relationship to the
legitimate goal of protecting public health. The court's "refusal"
to decide the scientific merits, exactly as inJacobson before it, re-
flects the view that it could not invalidate the health department's
action if the defendant-intervenors showed no more than a dis-
pute about the best way to reduce dangerous sexual activity. But,
of course, to determine that the evidence did no more than show
that scientific uncertainty existed, the court had necessarily to
scrutinize the medical evidence. Indeed, the court did not merely
determine that the challengers had done no more than cast doubt
on the value of closure, but found that the scientific evidence
"demonstrate[d] the inadequacy of self-policing procedures by
the St. Mark's attendant staff, and the futility of any less intrusive
124. Id. at 916, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 982.
125. Id. at 917, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 982-83.
126. Id. at 917, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 983 (quoting Chiropractic Ass'n of New
York v. Hilleboe, 12 N.Y.2d 109, 114, 187 N.E.2d 756, 757, 237 N.Y.S.2d 289,
291 (1962); Williams v. Mayor of Baltimore, 289 U.S. 36, 42 (1933)).
127. Other bathhouse decisions have found it difficult to pin down a level
of scrutiny. See, e.g., California v. Three 3 MCS, Inc., No. C685816 slip. op. (Cal.
Sup. Ct. Aug. 30, 1988). In a similar case brought by the city against a hetero-
sexual sex resort, a New York judge applied the New York derivative of the four-
pronged test enunciated in United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), on
incidental restrictions aimed at expressive activities protected by the first
amendment. City of New York v. Big Apple Spa, 130 Misc. 2d 920, 497
N.Y.S.2d 988 (Sup. Ct. 1986).
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solution to the problem other than closure."' 28
In practice, then, the court's decision was deeply rooted in
the specific factual context of the particular health action, focus-
ing on the evidence of what was actually occurring and of the effi-
cacy of closure. While there were differences in opinion between
reasonable public health officials, the court at each evidentiary
turn required the city to have at least some such support in its
corner.2 11 This goes far beyond the normal rational basis test,
which should have required only the recital of a plausible connec-
tion between closing a place of public accommodation and
preventing disease. It is particularly notable that nonmedical pol-
icy elements, such as the social value of a strong message in favor
of "conventional" sexual proclivities, were not mentioned. In
Saint Mark's, as in the Rehabilitation Act cases like Arline or
Glover's fourth amendment analysis, the factual inquiry is uni-
formly focused on the medical bases for action.
V. THE RULE OF MEDICAL RATIONALITY
It should be clear that few courts in traditional health cases
have ever applied the legislative model of health decisions that
would best fit the doctrinal account of review. Requiring a health
decision to be medically supportable itself places a limit on the
state's political freedom, narrowing the universe of justifications
128. Saint Mark's, 130 Misc. 2d at 915, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 982.
129. This approach to review was used much more consciously in a Los
Angeles bathhouse case:
It is quite clear that Defendants' [i.e., the opponents of closures] ex-
perts disagree with Plaintiff's experts and that, within the community
devoted to AIDS prevention and control, there is in fact a split of opin-
ion as to whether it helps to close gay bathhouses. As observed by the
[St. Alark's] court . . . it is not the function of the courts to determine
which scientific view is correct when deciding whether the police power
has been properly exercised. The evidence supporting the Plaintiffs'
view is substantial and persuasive and the fact that others might not
agree is simply not dispositive of the issue before me.
I appreciate the expertise and opinions of LAMBDA Legal Defense
and Education Fund and I understand that it is the view of Amicus as
well as . . . Defendants that bathhouses do not accelerate the spread of
AIDS. I do not attempt ... to decide this question; from the evidence
before me, this fact is not yet proven. What is proven, however, is that
high risk sexual activities in an environment conducive to multiple,
anonymous intimate contacts does [sic] facilitate the spread of HIV. In
the manner in which Mac's is being operated, these conditions are be-
ing met.
California v. Three 3 MCS, Inc., No. C685816, slip op. at 8-9 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Aug.
30. 1988).
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available to it under a rational basis test. So far, the behavioralists
are correct.
Granting that courts, for some collection of reasons, place
medical limitations on state health actions, it remains to delineate
the nature of such limitations. Are we seeing the use of a scien-
tific model, or a hybrid? Is the fourteenth amendment standard
the same as section 504's? It is at this point that the Arline foot-
note becomes decisive. A hypothetical case turning on the analy-
sis of a public health risk illuminates the standard of medical
reasonableness suggested in Arline's footnote fifteen.
A. Risk: One Problem in Health Politics
The analysis of risk epitomizes the metaphorical meeting of
medicine and politics. Particular risk can be assessed probabilisti-
cally based on past events with a high degree of precision. The
quantified likelihood of an event occurring, however, is but a
small factor in the average person's subjective assessment of the
chances of a bad event, and, if anything, an even smaller factor in
the decision to accept the risk. Although they can be disguised as
technical determinations relying on objective decision making, at
bottom the assessment and acceptance of risks-whether from the
chemical that makes apples redder, the fuels that make the globe
warmer, or the virus that causes AIDS-involve fundamental so-
cial choices.'" A judicial decision to place medical limits on the
public health decision, while not necessarily requiring the state to
make its choice about risk in a scientific manner, does at least re-
quire that the decision, however achieved, be justifiable in scien-
tific terms. I3 ' This places a real limitation on state policy
freedom, a limitation grounded in a cultural or political choice to
see risk in scientific terms. However sensible this may be-and I
think it is very sensible-we are left with the problem of how to fit
this requirement into the modern rational basis approach.
130. See, e.g., R. BAYER, supra note 29, at 167-68 (discussing "essentially
political character" of decisions with respect to risk and compulsory screening
for HIV).
131. One may roughly identify two ways in which a court's scientific model
can be concretized, both of which are suggested in the Adine case. One, of
course, is to require that the decision be made by scientists. This suggests an
emphasis, on review, on whether the process has conformed with acceptable
professional norms. Cf Ethyl Corp. v. EP"A, 541 F.2d 1, 66-67 (D.C. Cir.)
(Bazelon, J., concurring), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976). The other is to re-
quire that the decision actually represent a scientifically supportable approach.
The emphasis on review in this kind of approach would focus on the substance
of the decision and the evidence in its support. Cf. Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-
CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 473-76 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
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1. Assessing Risk
A scientific approach to risk depends on quantification and
comparison, while lay risk assessment tends to be impressionis-
tic.'132 For example, current statistics indicate that heart attacks
kill five times as many people as lung cancer, 133 yet the slow, pain-
ful death of cancer may strike many people as a far greater
threat.'13 4 Objective comparison of the likelihood of an event oc-
curring may suggest that a risk is "significant" or "minimal," but
such characterizations are relative and, therefore, dependent on
subjective individual experience of risk.'13 5 Events with serious or
horrible consequences, or about which one frequently hears,
seem more likely to occur than they actually are. Risks to which
one is personally exposed may seem more likely to occur than
risks to which one is not.13 6
Even agreed-upon risk assessments do not necessarily lead to
agreed-upon results, because risk assessment is distinguishable
from risk acceptability.'13 7 Parents who fully understand that the
chance of HIV transmission from teacher to child is one in a mil-
132. Of course, like public health decisions, risk assessments do contain de-
terminations that are not dictated by the numbers alone. See, e.g., Davis, The
"Shoigun Wl'edding" of Science and Law: Risk Assessment and Judicial Review, 10
COLUM.J. ENVTL. L. 67, 99 (1985) ("[T]he choice of a margin of safety-which is
a component of risk assessments-is also a keenly political question. Science
alone cannot rationalize a regulatory standard which is a 10th, 100th or 1000th
of the level at which no effect has been observed.").
133. Death Rate Declines Except for Mortality Related to Smoking, N.Y. Times,
April 2, 1989, § 1, at 12, col. 6.
134. S. SONTAG, supra note 30, at 38 ("Cancer is more feared than heart
diseases, although someone who has had a coronary is more likely to die of heart
disease in the next few years than someone who has cancer is likely to die of
cancer.").
135. See Gerbert, Maguire, Badner, Altman & Stone, lJ'y Fear Persists:
Health Care Professioials and AIDS, 260 J. A.M.A. 3481 (1988).
136. See, e.g., Kasper, Perceptions of Risk atid Their Effects in Decision Mlakiig, in
SOCIETAL RISK ASSESSMENT 71 (1980); Ratzan & Schneiderman, AIDS, Autopsies,
aiid Abaiidoiment, 260 J. A.M.A. 3466, 3466 (1988) ("Authorities note that 're-
sponse to losses is more extreme than response to gains' and that 'low probabili-
ties are overweighted, moderate and high probabilities are underweighted, and
the latter effect is more pronounced than the former.") (quoting Tversky &
Kahneman, The Framiing of Decisiois aid the Psychology of Choice, 211 SCIENCE 453
(1981)). Susan Sontag has written:
In contrast to the soft death imputed to tuberculosis, AIDS, like cancer,
leads to a hard death. The metaphorized illnesses that haunt the collec-
tive imagination are all hard deaths, or envisaged as such. Being deadly
is not in itself enough to produce terror. It is not even necessary, as in
the puzzling case of leprosy, perhaps the most stigmatized of all dis-
eases, although rarely fatal and extremely diflicult to transmit.
S. Sontag, supra note 30, at 38-41.
137. Ratzan & Schneiderman, supra note 136, at 3466.
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lion still may refuse to expose their child to the risk of being the
unlucky one. 138 Despite an understanding that everything in life
entails risk, and that the difference between the risk of harm com-
ing to the chid in the classroom with and without the teacher with
HIV is infinitesimal, the parent may attach great value to the mar-
ginal difference in safety, if only because it is attainable. Indeed,
the very recognition that life is pervaded by risks may inordi-
nantly enhance the subjective value of avoiding risks perceived to
be unnecessary and controllable. Moreover, risks are generally
proffered as costs of a greater benefit, whose perceived value fre-
quently depends on an individual or social decision that it is not
better to be safe than sorry. If the parent attaches little or no
value to the nondiscrimination principle, what does he gain in re-
turn for exposing his child to any additional risk from a school-
mate with HIV?
2. Cases of Risk
Risk has been a particularly important issue in the several
cases dealing with HIV in schools. :' ,' Given the CDC's convinc-
ing account of the epidemiology of AIDS, however, it has not re-
ally been the assessment of the risk in a school setting that has
been at the heart of the dispute, but rather its acceptability (either
in terms of its absolute dimension or the degree to which the
CDC is not "100 percent sure" of its assessment). An exemplary
case is Chalk v. United States District Court Central District of Califor-
nia,14° in which a teacher, Vincent Chalk, sought redress under
the Rehabilitation Act when he was reassigned by local school au-
thorities from his teaching job because he had AIDS.
The only medical evidence submitted by the defendants to
justify their decision was a deposition from another case, stating
the proposition that "there is a possibility, small though it is, that
there are vectors of transmission as yet not clearly defined."' 4'
138. Burris, Fear Iself, supra note 9, at 500; see Blendon & Donelan, supra
note 33, at 1024 (reporting "paradox" that while only 10% of parents believe
child can contract HIV from classroom contact, 33% would withdraw child from
school).
139. See, e.g., Martinez v. School Bd., 861 F.2d 1502 (11 th Cir. 1988);
Thomas v. Atascadero Unified School Dist., 662 F. Supp. 376 (D.C. Cal. 1986).
See generally Kass, School Children with AIDS, in AIDS AND THE LAW: A GUIDE FOR
THE PUBLIC 66 (H. Dalton, S. Burris & the Yale AIDS Law Project eds. 1987);
Cooper, AIDS Law: The Impact of AIDS on American Schools and Prisons, 1987 ANN.
SURV. AM. L. 117.
140. 840 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1988).
141. Id. at 707.
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By contrast, Chalk's position that the risk he posed was low was
supported by "more than 100 articles from prestigious medical
journals and the declarations of five experts on AIDS, including
two public health officials."' 42 The trial court applied the Arline
"otherwise qualified" test, focusing in particular on the
probability of transmission and the severity of the risk. The evi-
dence fairly compelled the conclusion that the risk of transmis-
sion of HIV from Chalk to his students was "minimal." The court
also found, however, that the results of such a transmission would
be "catastrophic."' 143 Because of the severity of the conse-
quences, and in the belief that "we do not know enough about
AIDS to be completely certain" in the assessment of either the
means or probability of transmission, 4 4 the court upheld that
school authorities' action.
The court of appeals chided the district court for placing an
"impossible" burden on the teacher. "Little in science can be
proved with complete certainty,"'' 4 5 it stated, making clear the
panel's view that the Rehabilitation Act (per Arline) set forth a sig-
nificant-risk standard that supplanted any lower risk standard pre-
ferred by a state in a section 504 case.'14" Given the extremely low
risk of transmission, and therefore despite the grave and perma-
nent consequences of transmission, the court found that Chalk
did not present a significant risk and was consequently "otherwise
qualified" to carry out his classroom duties.
Clearly, the court of appeals had the better of the district
court in interpreting the Rehabilitation Act. Arline suggests that,
in the absence of a significant risk of transmission, the severity of
the consequences will not make a risk "significant."'' 47 Just as
clearly, this view of risk privileges quantified risk assessment over
subjective evaluation of risk acceptability. The school authorities,
after all, believed there was a "significant risk," not as a scientist
would use the term, but as the district court did: a low probability
that a child would be infected with a frightening, fatal disease.
Moreover, that risk could be avoided at what was perceived as a
142. Id. at 706. The court also relied, in considering the likelihood of his
ultimately prevailing on the merits, on the outcomes in school cases like Atas-
cadero, 662 F. Supp. 376, and New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children v.
Carey, 612 F.2d 644 (2d Cir. 1979). Chalk, 840 F.2d at 708.
143. Chalk, 840 F.2d at 707.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 707-08; accord Martinez v. School Bd., 861 F.2d 1502, 1506 (11 th
Cir. 1988).
147. See Arline, 480 U.S. at 287 & n.16.
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relatively low cost: one person's professional (and even personal)
well-being was viewed as an acceptable price to pay to avoid ex-
posing children to HIV, and the stress of a negative public reac-
tion to that risk.14 8
Imagine, however, that Vincent Chalk had worked part time
at his public school, and part time at a private academy receiving
no federal funds. Imagine further that a state health law barred
teachers with communicable diseases from the classroom. Chalk,
dismissed, can seek reinstatement in his public school position
under the Rehabilitation Act, but can reclaim his private school
job only by showing that the state's health law fails the rational
basis test. 141 Assume that Chalk is found to present a less-than-
significant risk of HIV transmission, and therefore, cannot be dis-
criminated against by his federally-funded employer. 5 ) The Ar-
line footnote suggests that his constitutional challenge should
turn out no differently. In the absence of evidence suggesting a
significant risk, there could hardly be a reasonable medical basis
for the action. Yet that analysis begs the question.
Under a rational basis analysis applying a legislative model of
the decision, the question would be whether there was any state
of the world in which the legislature could have believed a law
barring teachers with communicable diseases would have the de-
148. The court of appeals' decision reflected the view that the school au-
thorities' approach to risk had been precluded by Congress when it adopted a
scientific model of the health decision. It is interesting to note, however, that
this is not the way the court discussed the issue. Justifying its decision, it did not
speak of the authority of Congress to choose a medical standard, such as signifi-
cant risk, over a political one, such as avoidance of very low risks with very seri-
ous consequences. Instead, it spoke of the rarity of certain proof in science, as if
setting a standard for safety that could not be met by medical proof was inher-
ently irrational. The court spoke, that is, not from without the scientific model
but from within.
149. See Merritt, supra note 13, at 765-74; cf. Note, Constitutional Rights, supra
note 7, at 1289-90 (suggesting, rather tepidly, that heightened scrutiny might be
applied). The hypothetical assumes that the state does not have its own antidis-
crimination law covering HIV. As California's Arline amicus brief explained, the
decision of states to bind themselves by such statutes is itself persuasive evi-
dence that they did not see extending the antidiscrimination principle to cover
people with communicable diseases as a threat to their ability to protect the pub-
lic health. Brief of the State of California joined by Maryland, Michigan, Minne-
sota, New Jersey, New York and Wisconsin as Amici Curiae at 26, School Bd. v.
Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987) (No. 85-1277).
150. At least as to the federally-funded public school, the case would pres-
ent a preemption issue which we may assume would be decided against the ap-
plication of the state health law in a manner inconsistent with the Rehabilitation
Act. It could, similarly, be argued that the state law in and of itself constituted
handicap discrimination, and that the state could not enforce the requirement
even in a school not receiving federal funds.
1989]
43
Burris: Rationality Review and the Politics of Public Health
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1989
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
sired protective effect. Several come readily to mind. Some dis-
eases, like measles or mumps, might be more readily
communicated. There is also the remote possibility that teachers
and students will have sex, or even share drugs. There would be
ample room in this analysis to uphold the firing of a teacher with
AIDS without any serious reference to reasonable medical evidence
of the specific likelihood of Chalk's transmitting the particular vi-
rus under these particular circumstances.' 5 ' Indeed, even were
the court to employ the kind of close, context-specific analysis ex-
pected under the behavioral account of traditional health cases, a
requirement of significant risk, as in the Glover decision, assumes
away the state's best argument: If the state's claim is the right to
prevent children being exposed to any level of catastrophic risk,
why need it show that the risk is significantly likely to occur? 152
Certainly, few would question that a court decision barring
Chalk from his private school job because he presented some the-
oretical risk of transmission but allowing him back into the public
school classroom because he presented a less-than-significant risk
would be bizarre. Indeed, to bar him from the private school
would be bizarre even without the counterpoint. The state's
claim of a prerogative to apply a no-risk standard sounds very
much like the kind of archaic and groundless attitudes "based on
the irrational fear" of contagion, 53 the "discrimination on the
basis of mythology"'' 54 that the Supreme Court condemned in Ar-
151. In Doe v. Coughlin, 71 N.Y.2d 48, 518 N.E.2d 536, 523 N.Y.S.2d 782
(1987), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 196 (1988), the New York Court of Appeals upheld
the constitutionality of barring inmates with AIDS from participating in a conju-
gal visit program. Among the decidedly speculative harms it accepted in finding
rationality, the plurality opinion included the possibility that subsequent
spouses and children of a conjugal visitor infected with AIDS would also become
infected.
152. See Merritt, supra note 13, at 758-60 (discussing this issue in context of
school admission). The recent decision in Von Raab, in which the Court found
reasonable a customs service drug-testing program, presents an analogous situa-
tion: although there was no proof that customs employees were or were not
likely to be compromised in their work because of drug use, the Court upheld
the testing in reliance upon the potentially fatal consequences of such abuse.
National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. 1384, 1395 (1989).
The Court stated:
The mere circumstances that all but a few of the employees tested are
entirely innocent of wrongdoing does not impugn the program's valid-
ity .... Where, as here, the possible harm against which the Govern-
ment seeks to guard is substantial, the need to prevent its occurrence
furnishes an ample justification for reasonable searches calculated to
advance the Government's goal.
Id.; see id. at 1398-99 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
153. Arline, 480 U.S. at 284.
154. Id. at 285.
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line. The essence of this "irrationality" is the rejection of scien-
tific values and knowledge: it is acting in the belief that
something demonstrably unlikely to occur will take place because
of the fit of such an occurrence within a mythic plotline. No plot
is more effective in its inevitability than that the leper infects, that
all lepers are degenerate, or that identifying and isolating all the
lepers will keep the rest of us safe from harm. The Court was
talking about this kind of irrationality in a section 504 case, but its
language is by no means limited by that. This was not "irrational-
ity" or "mythology" or "reflexive reactions" for purposes of sec-
tion 504 only. This was irrationality made actionable under
section 504.
Nevertheless, the decision to fire the hypothetical Chalk is bi-
zarre only if one starts with the view that risk is properly assessed
in a scientific way. A decision to readmit him is only the proper
result if one concedes that a court is empowered to impose its
view of substantive rationality upon the state. The choice be-
tween a lay risk assessment focusing on consequences and a scien-
tific risk regime giving more weight to likelihood of occurrence in
a given setting is ultimately a political one. The political decision
to evaluate risk in a scientific rather than lay manner has been
attributed under section 504 to Congress. What is the source of
that policy under the Constitution? Given that the handicapped
do not appear to fit within the Court's definition of a suspect or
quasi-suspect class, and that employment is not a fundamental
right, why should not the state be allowed to fire a teacher with
AIDS?
I am decidedly not suggesting that the state be allowed under
the Constitution to place serious impediments in the career paths
of people who pose no serious risk to anyone. On the contrary,
unless footnote fifteen is inadvertent error, there seems not way
to avoid a conclusion that the Court intends to prevent such
measures under the rational basis test as well as under section
504. I am suggesting that courts will rarely, if ever, judge health
actions by any but medical standards, and, consequently, will al-
ready have abandoned the pure deference captured in the legisla-
tive model of the health decision. To that extent, the
behavioralists have it right. Leaving aside the question of how
this behavior fits in with general constitutional law, then, the final
task of this essay is to offer a clearer, more coherent description
of the proper test, with some thoughts about its practical
application.
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B. The "Rational Medical Basis" Test
Arline's footnote fifteen sets forth a requirement that health
actions be supportable by the "medically reasonable judgments"
of health officials, to whom courts are to defer. 55 In this is the
core of what can best be described as a "rational medical basis
test." This is not so much a heightened as it is a focused standard
of review, using a hybrid model of the decision under which state
political freedom to abridge constitutional rights in matters of
public health is limited by a requirement of medical reasonable-
ness. What follows is a preliminary account of the test.
The test itself is readily described. It places a medical limita-
tion on state policymaking that has two distinct components. The
first, a requirement that the decision be medically justified, pre-
cludes all manner of other possible explanations for a health mea-
sure, from preserving social morale to saving money. Whatever
explanations are offered of the means and ends of the measure
must be medical ones. But the requirement does more than limit
the universe of justifications: the Court's specification that the
medical judgment be "reasonable" precludes the kind of logical
but far-fetched claims that would be enough to sustain an action
under the rational basis test. The substance of the Arline ap-
proach has been well described in the behavioral account of ra-
tionality review, which, as discussed above, demonstrates that
courts in public health cases have tended to consider the actual
necessity of a measure, its likely effectiveness, its costs to individ-
uals in relation to its benefits, and the existence of other equally
effective, less costly alternatives.
It would be inaccurate, however, to categorize this as height-
ened scrutiny.' 15 To begin with, it does not shift the burden of
justification to the state. The state does not need to prove that it
is right, but only to produce a reasonable medical judgment sug-
gesting that it is not wrong. 157 A challenger carries her burden
only if she can show that the health measure in question is not
155. Id. at 286 n. 15.
156. This is a distinction that eluded the Fifth Circuit in Brennan v.
Stewart, 834 F.2d 1248 (5th Cir. 1988), which is the decision that has come the
closest to fulfilling the doctrinal potential of Cleburne. In Brennan the court de-
scribed its "rational basis" scrutiny of government decision based on mental or
physical handicaps as "somewhat closer than usual." Id. at 1258.
157. It is particularly noteworthy that in most of the health cases discussed
here-Arline, Glover, Chalk-the health decision at issue was taken, not by a
health official, but by a person or entity with some incidental duty to protect
public health, but no particular public health expertise.
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medically reasonable under the actual conditions in which it is ap-
plied.15 18 Mere disagreement between medical authorities, or un-
certainty as to the value of the chosen action, will not be enough.
Moreover, it remains a deferential standard: the court must
defer to the judgment of health officials "unless those judgments
are medically unsupportable." 159 While the requirement of medi-
cal reasonableness already constitutes a substantial limitation on
the state's freedom to act, the requirement does not change the
nature of the constitutional inquiry. In the rational basis health
case, the court does not sit to choose or require the "best solu-
tion," but only to guarantee that the challenged state action has
enough of a medical basis to be reasonable in public health terms.
While deference to health officials tends to cut against the state in
cases where the action at issue resulted from the decision of non-
health personnel (for example, a school board), in cases like Saint
Mark's, where the action was initiated by the health department,
the rule of deference will make the measure very difficult, if not
impossible, to defeat.'"t °
Finally, the test does not intrude on the process by which the
action is chosen. The decision to implement a particular measure
does not have to have been made on a medical basis, nor must
non-medical factors have been excluded. Rather, the test de-
mands only that however the decision was made, and on whatever
otherwise allowable basis, it be medically supportable.'"' This
158. Although this essay cannot undertake to describe the elements of
medical rationality, there appear to be many ways in which a health action could
be shown to be unreasonable: for example, there might exist an alternative that
was considerably more effective and without a serious cost to individual rights;
or it might be that the measure selected has a substantial cost to the persons
against whom it will be applied, but has been rejected as without public health
value by the vast majority of responsible public health officials. For a discussion
of the proper criteria for health action, see generally Gostin, supra note 11.
159. Arline, 480 U.S. at 286 n.15.
160. Deference has the potential for being the joker in the deck of public
health law. Its role has frequently been overestimated in past health cases,
which, for the most part, have dealt with just two medically unimpeachable
measures, vaccination and water fluoridation. In modern cases, it may well pose
a problem of local versus national standards. It is not at all clear what courts will
do when and if a local health department adopts a measure unavoidably in con-
flict with the recommendations of national health officials such as the Centers
for Disease Control.
161. It is in this way distinguishable from the apparently "scientific" model
of § 504. Using a hybrid model, the court will not consider how the decision was
made, or even whether the medical justifications being offered to support a
health measure were actually considered by the legislators or health officials who
promulgated it, so long as there is in fact a reasonable medical basis for the
measure. By contrast, the analysis under § 504 involves, it would appear, a de
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test focuses more narrowly on the challenged measure and the
state's justification, but it does not heighten generally the state's
burden. It is not strict in theory, and will also not be fatal in
fact. 162
Such a test proceeds, it must also be said, upon a proper esti-
mation of the state's interest in health actions. In Arline, the State
of California argued, and the Supreme Court agreed, that the
states have no interest in health measures which are not, in fact,
reasonably likely to secure a medical benefit. Indeed, the amici
wrote that "[i]f Section 504 were invoked to preclude actions by
public health officials which were based on irrational, uninformed
or medically unsupportable distinctions, the public interest would
be furthered not hindered."' 63 Implicit in this view, and in the
treatment of health cases on a more or less medical basis through-
out public health law, are the notions that the medical reasonable-
ness of a health measure is an objective characteristic courts are
capable of identifying on the basis of medical evidence, and that
doing so does not interfere with the fulfillment of legitimate state
interests.
The states undoubtedly do have a substantial interest in be-
ing able to take necessary action in the absence of complete or
uncontradictable knowledge. Public health officials charged with
preventing ill health must often proceed despite uncertainty
about the nature of a threat or the efficacy of a remedy, and will
normally elect to err on the side of caution.164 This test accom-
modates that interest. Because the state need only produce rea-
sonable medical support for its measure, the test privileges the
state to proceed with health actions in areas of uncertainty.
Under this test, indeed, political freedom asserts itself most
prominently as a means of resolving medical uncertainty." 5
novo decision-making process in the courts, in which actual health officials will
recreate the decision considering only the medical issues.
162. See Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court:
A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972).
163. Brief of the State of California joined by Maryland, Michigan, Minne-
sota, New Jersey, New York and Wisconsin as Amici Curiae at 29, School Bd, v.
Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987) (No. 85-1277).
164. See Gostin, supra note 11, at 489 ("Public health is based on the as-
sumption that it is preferable to provide maximum protection against the spread
of infectious disease. It is best that any risk of error be on the side of a ... more
cautious approach.").
165. The use of deference as a means of resolving medical uncertainty is
rather common. In cases of setting safe exposure levels to dangerous sub-
stances, for example, the government must ground its findings of significant risk
in substantial medical evidence, but "is not required to support its finding....
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This has been a schematic introduction to the test derivable
from Arline and the constitutional health cases of the past. While
this discussion only begins to suggest the complexities of imple-
menting, much less justifying, such a test, it suggests that the
Court's nascent approach places a limitation on state prerogatives
that will prevent irrational and punitive health measures without
compromising the state's essential authority to protect public
health.
VI. CONCLUSION
The great wrongs of the HIV epidemic will not arise so much
in obviously irrational acts as in the steady procession of meas-
ures-pre-marital screening, prostitute testing, segregation of
HIV-positive prison inmates, mandatory testing of hospital pa-
tients-which "make sense" to the People precisely because they
comport with deeply held ideas about disease and disease control
as traditionally practiced. Each of these is unreasonable to some
degree in public health terms because of the high ratio of costs to
benefits, and because the threat addressed is of a low order of
magnitude in relation to other vectors of HIV transmission. They
are unreasonable, that is, because they are predicated on the be-
lief that something unlikely to occur is likely to occur, because its
occurrence comports with a pre-existing impression of the world.
In reviewing actions of this kind under the rational basis test, the
willingness of courts to seriously address their medical reasona-
bleness will be decisive.
There has been a tendency to think of public health cases as
striking the balance between individual rights and public welfare.
This essay has suggested that, at least for lawyers, the prime issue
is delineating the freedom of the People to identify what is good
public health policy and to select the means by which to achieve
it. We enter the second decade of the HIV epidemic with several
with anything approaching scientific certainty." Industrial Union Dep't v. Amer-
ican Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 656 (1980) (plurality opinion); accord Forg-
ing Indus. Ass'n v. Secretary of Labor, 773 F.2d 1436, 1443 (4th Cir. 1985).
Similarly, an employer taking action to protect employee health (to make out a
business necessity defense), in part "carries its burden by showing that the body
of opinion believing that significant risk exists is so considerable 'that an in-
formed employer could not responsibly fail to act on the assumption that this
opinion might be the accurate one.' " Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hosp., 726
F.2d 1543, 1548 (11 th Cir. 1984) (quoting Wright v. Olin Corp., 697 F.2d 1172,
1191 (4th Cir. 1982); see also Perritt, Vegotiated Rulemaking Before Federal Agencies:
Evaluation of Recommendations by the Administrative Conference of the Tnited States, 74
GEO. L.J. 1625 (1986).
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alternative legal devices for answering this basis question-the
Rehabilitation Act, the fourth amendment and traditional public
health law. In Arline, the Supreme Court suggested that the an-
swers derived from these different regimes would be congruent.
Whether the Court is correct will depend on how well its sig-
nals are read. I have suggested that the practice of traditional
health decisions, and the understated instruction of Arline's foot-
note fifteen, is to require, even under the most deferential stan-
dard of review, that any health actions have a rational medical
relationship to the goal of protecting public health. I have pro-
vided a formulation of the proper test, in order that constitutional
protection would not, in Professor Tribe's words, "be left to the
manipulable discretion of judges operating with multiple stan-
dards of review all masquerading as 'minimum rationality.' "66
Nevertheless, the rational basis review of health decisions remains
part of the larger confusion of three-tiered scrutiny, and one must
be appropriately cautious in expecting the Court to carve out any
explicit exceptions to its beleaguered rules of review.
In the end, the degree to which courts will overturn quietly
hysterical health decisions will depend on their willingness to en-
gage in sophisticated cultural and medical analysis and explana-
tion, a willingness one cannot pretend to believe will be
generous. Nevertheless, we already have a more promising start-
ing point than perhaps we anticipated: mere logic will not be
enough to justify a health measure even under minimal constitu-
tional scrutiny. Taking Arline seriously, we may challenge courts
to demand some reasonable medical basis for a health action, and
to reject actions that proceed primarily from reflexive mythology.
But ultimately, if we are to take health law and the Arline footnote
seriously, we are left with unanswered questions of the most fun-
damental nature. "Conform ... decisions with medically reason-
able judgments"' 1 7 is the passing answer. Will courts apply the
test?
166. L. TRIBE, supra note 15, § 16-3, at 1445.
167. Arline, 480 U.S. at 286 n.15.
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